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Abstract  
This essay seeks to point the trends and recent dynamics of income distribution in 
Brazil from various perspectives. While the previous paper (Paper C Brazil) aimed to 
establish the relation between regimes of accumulation and labour market dynamics 
with the evolution of income distribution building on a historical perspective, this paper 
aims to identify, over and beyond the evolution of indicators, the new inequality 
patterns in order to show how spatial and social cleavages were reorganized as well as 
the orientation of the country’s class structure. Micro-data  provided by the National 
Household Sample Survey (PNAD, from the Portuguese Pesquisa Nacional por 
Amostra de Domicílios) of Brazil’s national statistics office Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) has been used for selected years between 1979and 2011.  
 
 
Keywords: per capita household and labour income, labour market segmentations, 





IHD-Cebrap project on  






Project paper D  
 





Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa; Maria Cristina Cacciamali; Fabio Tatei; Ian Prates; Eduardo Cury 
and  Murillo Marschner 
 
22 October, 2015 








Table of Contents 
 
Patterns of income inequality in Brazil: recent evolution ....................................................... 4 
Historical context ........................................................................................................................ 5 
1. Trends in inequality ................................................................................................................ 7 
1.1. Per capita household income ............................................................................................. 7 
1.2. Individual labour income ................................................................................................. 11 
2. Inequality across groups ....................................................................................................... 15 
2.1. Decomposition of household income inequality ............................................................... 15 
2.2. Labour income inequality by worker characteristics ....................................................... 17 
3. Wage inequality in Brazil ..................................................................................................... 30 
4. Regression-based inequality decomposition ....................................................................... 35 
5. Factorial decomposition of Gini index in Brazil from 2003 to 2011 ................................. 42 
5.1. Decomposition of Gini coefficient by region .................................................................... 44 
5.2. Extending the spatial analysis: decomposition of Gini coefficient by region and area ... 47 
6. Relationship between income and consumption-expenditure inequality ......................... 51 
7. Functional distribution of income ........................................................................................ 55 
8. Main Shifts in the Occupational and Class Structures ...................................................... 57 
8.1. Shifts in the sectoral structure .......................................................................................... 57 
8.2. Shifts in the occupational structure .................................................................................. 63 
8.3. Class Structure ................................................................................................................. 69 
References .................................................................................................................................. 78 





Patterns of income inequality in Brazil: recent evolution 
 
This essayseeks to point the trends and recent dynamics of income distribution in Brazil 
from various perspectives. If the previous paper (Paper C) aimed to establish the 
relation between regimes of accumulation andlabour market dynamics with the 
evolution of income distribution building on a historical perspective, nowthe aim is to 
identify, over and beyond the evolution of indicators, the new inequality patterns in 
order to show how spatial and social cleavages were reorganizedas well as the 
orientation of the country’s class structure. 
After a brief historical account, in the first topic we present inequality indicators–the 
Gini and Theil indices, the 90:10 decile ratios and the income appropriation by the 
richest 10%, the intermediate 40%, and the poorest 50% – for per capita household and 
labour income. We used the microdata provided bythe National Household Sample 
Survey (PNAD, from the Portuguese Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios) of 
Brazil’s national statistics office Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) 
for selected years between 1979and 2011. 
In the second topic, we measure how much different segmentations of the labour market 
can explain the overall pattern and trend of inequality show in the previous topic.Thus, 
we use the decomposition of Theil index according to various characteristics -regions, 
urban/rural, sex, race/colour, schooling and work status. The decomposition is a 
standard technique to establish, in percentage terms, what is the proportion of overall 
wage inequality due to wage inequality within the groups being analysed, and what is 
the proportion due to wage inequality between them. 
Similarly, the third topic summarizes inequality estimates for wages, i.e. restricting the 
estimates for private employees only, with the aim of measuring if the patterns of 
inequality between wage earners are different from the inequality for the total 
workforce. 
The fourth topic presents a multivariate analysis that seeks to measure the contribution 
of a set of variables on inequality of household income, expenditure,labour income and 
wages. We used PNAD data for 1995, 1999, 2005, 2009 and 2011, and Household 
Budget Survey2008/09 (POF, from the Portuguese Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares, 
also from Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística). 
In a different approach, in the fifth topicour analysis focuses on the decomposition of 
the Gini coefficientfor per capita household incomeby sources of income for the 2003-
2011period,which is characterized by a decrease in inequality in the country, also 
building on PNAD data, yet with an emphasis on regions and census areas (urban/rural). 
In the sixth topic, we calculate the most significant of the aforementioned inequality 
indicators from the2002-2003 and 2008-2009 Household Budget Survey (POF, from the 
Portuguese Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares). The purpose is comparing 
inequalityoutcomes derived from two kinds of data: income and expenditure.  
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Accordingly, in the seventh topic we conduct an analysis, whose results must be 
confirmed in the future, about the changes in the functional composition of income 
between 1990 and 2009, drawing on data by IBGE’s National System of Accounts 
(SCN, from the Portuguese Sistema de Contas Nacionais). 
Finally, in the eighth topic we seek to show the relationships between the changes in 
income distribution profile and the changes in occupational and class structure, drawing 




Historically Brazil has always had very high levels ofincome distribution inequality, 
ranking among the countries with the highest concentration. The mutually feeding 
factors causing that are multiple over time. For 300 years, the slave regime 
commoditized those who were the most active in the workforce, until the late 19th 
century, excluding them from property, the educational system, and any kind of right, 
rendering the very concept of citizenship impracticable.From the nineteenth century on, 
the accumulation cycles were concentrated in the Southeast, creating persisting regional 
inequalities that became stronger with the industrialization process, especially after the 
1950s. The State-driven import-substitution process, particularly its key sectors,was 
capital- and skilled labour-intensive in contrast with a predominantly poorly-
skilledlabour force, further compounding the distributive issue. During the military 
regime in the 1970s, basic wages were outgrown by productivity due to a number of 
interrelated factors, including minimum wage containment, rising inflation, the 
dismantling of the labour movement, and the tax structure’s regressivity.A scarcity in 
skilled labour, in a context of dramatic production transformations, coupled with the 
bargaining power of the ruling groups, widened wage differentials over the period, thus 
significantly increasing income concentration(Table 1).Conversely, totallabour income 
lost space in the functional distribution of income, further compounding concentration 
in a capitalist economy drawn by increasingly higher rates of profit. 
Until the late 1980s, social policies did not play a distributive role, both because of the 
asymmetric school system and the limited coverage of the Social Protection System, 
social security restricted to formal workers, and the meagre and clientelistic social 
assistance provided to the poorest population, migrants, and informal workers. 
Moreover, from 1980 to the mid-1990s inflation eroded the purchasing power of the 
middle and poor strata, as they had no alternative in terms of indexing their 
remuneration, prompting a persisting high-inequality pattern.1 Only after 1994, when 
the inflationary process was tamed and a new economic phase with price stability 
ensued, a new social policy could be put in practice according to the precepts of the 
1988 Federal Constitution. The economic growth of the 2000s enabled maintaining and 
1In the 1970s and 1980s the Brazilian Economic Policy had adopted a complex system of indexation in 
order to protect the money real value. 
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broadening a social policy that targeted mostly the most vulnerable groups and 
prompted a decrease in per capita household income inequality of -6.6 percentage points 
between 1999 and 2011. Still, the level of inequality remains high by any international 
standard, while access to quality goods and services varies widely across social strata in 
Brazilian society. 
 
Table 1 –Income distribution of workforce by percentiles and Gini index.  
Brazil 1960-2012 
 
Percentiles 1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 
Poorest 10%  1.9 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 
Poorest 30% 5.9 6.2 6.2 5.3 4.6 5.6 6.2 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.8 7.2 7.3 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.7 8.7 
Poorest 50% 17.4 15.1 14.1 13.1 11.2 13.0 13.9 14.4 14.4 14.8 15.2 15.7 16.1 16.9 17.0 17.5 18.3 18.4 
Richest 30%  66.1 71.7 73.2 74.6 76.4 74.5 73.1 72.6 72.7 72.0 71.3 70.9 70.3 69.3 68.9 68.4 67.2 67.1 
Richest 10%  39.6 46.5 47.9 47.7 49.7 48.2 46.8 46.9 47.1 46.1 45.4 45.4 44.9 43.9 43.4 43.0 41.9 42.0 
Richest 1%  12.1 14.5 13.5 13.3 13.9 13.4 13.0 13.6 13.5 13.2 13.0 13.3 13.1 12.6 12.4 12.5 12.0 12.9 
Gini index 0497 0.565 0.592 0.611 0.620 0.592 0.576 0.572 0.573 0.566 0.559 0.552 0.548 0.534 0.531 0.524 0.508 0.509 






1. Trends in inequality 
 
1.1.Per capita household income 
 
Graph 1 shows theevolution, on a continuous basis, of the level of per capita household 
income in Brazil between 1979and 2011.2The 1980s till the beginning of the 1990s are 
marked by the foreign debt crisis, and by economic instability, mostly caused by high 
inflation rates triggered by a drop in average productivity. In line with this picture, per 
capita household income in Brazil also has an erratic evolution, being negatively 
affected especially during the recessions of 1981-1983 and1990-1992 (Dedecca, Baltar, 
1998). 
Conversely, the recovery witnessed during the Real Plan, with a 25% increase in per 
capita household income between 1993 and 1995, would be more than offset by the 
deterioration of the labour market from 1996 to 1998 and by losses stemming from the 
1999 devaluation(Ramos, Britto, 2004).Only after 2001 would the per capita household 
income resume steady growth, expanding by 33.8% andoutperforming the late 1980s 
peak for the first time. This data compriseslabour and retirement income and computes 
the number of household members, which fell over the period. Below we show the 
average per capita labour income (Graph 1). 
 
Graph 1 – Annual average of real per capita household income. Brazil. 1979-2011. 
(constant 2012 R$) 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
2We stress that temporal comparability of the income variable in Brazil should be seen with great 




                                                          
 
With reference to income inequality, we can distinguish a clearly different evolution 
from that of the average income. The Gini coefficient for the period peaks in 1989,falls 
slightly in the period when the Real Plan begins, and remains at this level until the end 
of the decade. Starting in 2003, we notice a significant reduction in per capita household 
income inequality, with Gini going from 0.577 in 2003 to 0.527 in 2011, a-8.7% 
decrease (Graph 2). As we shall see ahead, this decrease was driven by the recovery of 
the labour market, especially of formal jobs, by the minimum wage appreciation policy, 
and by the expansion of the cash transfer programs targeting the poorest population as 
from 2003 on. 
 
Graph 2 – Gini coefficient of per capita household income. Brazil. 1979-2011. 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
The evolution of income inequality in Brazil can also be viewed by another measure, 
the Theil index. The main difference between both indices is that Gini is more sensitive 
to income variations of people in higher frequency distributions, whereas Theil is more 
accurate in detecting variations at the extremities of the distribution (Hoffmann, 1992).  
Graph 3 shows us that the evolution of income inequality in Brazil is consistent 
regardless of the measure used. That is, increased inequality in the 1980s, slight drop 
and stagnation in the 1990s, and significant decrease in the 2000s. On the other 
hand,our attention is drawn to the high 1989 Theil index, corroborating the fact that 
high inflation rates hit hardest the poorest portion of the population. Moreover, the 
percentage reduction in the Theil index in the 2000s was higher than that measured by 
Gini, -16.3% against -8.7% from 2003 to 2011. This corroborates the fact that the drop 
in income inequality was driven both by the relative increase of the income receivedby 
the poorest portion of the population and by a relative decrease in the percentage 




Graph 3 –Theil index of per capita household income. Brazil. 1979-2011. 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
Another way of viewing income inequality is through thecoefficient R/P 10%, which 
indicates how many times the income of the 10% richest (R 10%)is bigger than that of 
the 10% poorest (P 10%). In 1979the upper decile earned a per capita household income 
52.4 times higher than that of the households in the lowest decile (Graph 4).As with the 
other measures, we notice that 1989 appears as the worst year in terms of income 
distribution in the recent Brazilian history. That year, the income of the richest was 
80.2times higher than that of the poorest. In 2011,this difference had plunged to 36.5 
times, a decrease that was particularly significant over the 2000s. However, this ratio is 
still much higher in comparison with the developed countries. For example, in 2009 this 
ratio was of 2.8times in Denmark and of 5.9times in the United States (OECD, 2011). 
Graph 4 – 10:10 ratio of per capita household income. Brazil. 1979-2011. 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
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In order to view what this decrease in inequality means in terms of income 
appropriation for the various strata, we present below a distribution tableof per capita 
household, as adopted by Piketty (2014), from Kuznets (1953), representing the 
proportion of total income owned by the highest 10%, the intermediate 40% and the 
lowest 50% population strata. According to the author, this method is more accurate in 
capturing how total income is being distributed than the figure provided by Gini or 
Theil. 
 
Graph 5 – Distribution of per capita household income by population share. Brazil. 1979-
2011. 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
We can see, for instance, that the share of the poorest 50% goes from 10% in 1989 to 
12% after the Real Plan, when levels are equivalent to those found in 1983, rising to 
14% in the following decade. In 2009, this participation gets close to 15%, pointing to 
the maintenance of the income levels of the poorest strata in the first years of the 
financial crisis of the late 2000s due to the implementation of countercyclical policies in 
support of aggregate demand.The intermediate 40% remain, throughout the 1990s, with 
an income appropriation of about 38.5%, slightly above that of 1989. This stratum’s 
share in total income would rise in the 2000s to reach 43% in 2011. At the top of the 
pyramid, the wealthiest 10%, whose share had risen to 52.7% in 1989, see their share 
level out in the 1990s, yet at a higher level than that of 1983. In 2003, this stratum’s 
share steadily decreases until it reaches 42.6% in 2011, showing a higher growth of the 





1.2.Individual labour income 
 
Estimates in several studies (Soares, 2006; Barros, Carvalho, Franco, 2007; Cacciamali, 
Camillo, 2011; Hoffmann, 2013; Cacciamali et al., 2013)point to the primacy of the 
labour market to account for thedramatic drop in income inequality in Brazil in the 
2000s. This makes it necessary to verify the evolution of labour income in the country 
throughout the period under analysis. Accordingly, this section presents the same 
indicators as in the previous section,yet this time only considering labour income. We 
will attempt to emphasize those aspects that distinguish the evolution of average labour 
income from per capita household income. 
This section analyses the distribution of overall labour income in Brazil since the PNAD 
includes the income earned by self-employed workers. However, this does not alter the 
analysis of inequality in the Brazilian labour market since the estimates for labour 
income and wages have similar pattern; as we shall see in the topic 3. 
Firstly we observe the real evolution of this variable (Graph 6), which rose by 10.6% 
from 1979to 2011, that is, at a much lower level than that of per capita household 
income over the same period – 48.1%. This is due to the smaller size of households; the 
existence of other sources of income, retirement pensions, mostly rural, and public 
transfers, for example, increasingly more important in the 1990s; and also toa higher 
occupation rate, particularly in the 2000s (Neri, Souza, 2013).In other words, the 
expansion of formal employment enabled the inclusion of people who had no income or 
were inactive, thus increasing per capita household income faster than labour income, 
especially in the case of the poorest, in the post-2003 period. 
 
Graph 6 – Annual average of real labour income. Brazil. 1979-2011. 
(constant 2012 R$) 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
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For the sake of illustration, the average occupied worker’s income was of R$ 1,378.00 
in 2011 (in 2012 values) against R$ 985.00 for the per capita household income. This 
40% differential represents half of that measured in 1979. On the other hand, just as in 
the previous section, 2003 is a year of economic cycle contraction, just as 2011 
represents the peak of an expansionary cycle that gains momentum from 2005 onwards. 
Graph 7 shows that the drop in Gini for the period of greatest fall in labour income 
inequality (2003 to 2011) was of -9.7%, higher than the percentage obtained for per 
capita household income, -8.7%.This behaviour reflects the narrowing of income 
differentials across workers, with an impact on the decrease in differences across 
individuals by sex, skin colour, and between skilled and unskilled, and formal and 
informal individuals (Cacciamali, Tatei, Rosalino, 2009; Cacciamali, Tatei, 2013), as 
we shall see ahead. 
 
Graph7 – Gini coefficient of labour income. Brazil. 1979-2011. 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
The same result is achieved through the Theil index (Graph 8) and the coefficient R/P 
10% (Graph 9). As in the previous section, we note that the Gini coefficient shows a 
somewhat subtler variation over time vis-à-vis the other inequality measures. And that 
the decrease was sharper in the case of Theil, -15.4%, and of R/P 10%, which fell from 






Graph8 – Theil index of labour income. Brazil. 1979-2011. 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
Graph9 – 90th:10th ratio of labour income. Brazil. 1979-2011. 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
The distribution table for the case of labour income presents some differences worth 
mentioning as regards per capita household income (Graph 10). First, the share of the 
50% poorest is up from 14.4% to 16.7%from 2003 to 2011, an impressive percentage 
growth of 16%. The amount of total income appropriated by the poorest 10%, as per 
labour income, is also higher than that appropriated by the poorest 10% by the per 
capita household income criterion. 
For the intermediate 40%, we find a drop in this stratum’s participation in labour 
income by -7.7% from 2003 and 2011; whereas the richest 10% increase the amount of 
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total income appropriated from 44.9% to 45.8% over the same period. This probably 
explains the smaller labour income decreaseas measured by the Theil index– more 
sensitive to capture income at the extremities –of -15.4%, as compared with per capita 
household income, 16.3% from 2003 to 2011. Thus, if we look only from the prism of 
the labour market, redistribution occurred among the poorest 50% and the intermediate 
40% and not from the richest 10% to the first groupings. This redistribution has several 
interconnected causes, the most important of which are an increase in formal 
employment associated with the increase of the minimum wage and a higher supply, as 
a proportion of demand, of workers with middle education(Corseuil, Foguel, 2012; 
Barbosa-Filho, Moura, 2012).  
 
Graph 10 – Distribution of labour income by population share. Brazil. 1979-2011. 
 





2. Inequality across groups 
 
2.1. Decomposition of household income inequality 
 
The previous section made it evident that, overall, there are no significant differences in 
trends between the selected income inequality measures – Gini, Theil, and income ratio 
– with reference to the slope of the curve over time, with a change occurring only in the 
variation span. For the present study, the Theil indexproves more attractive due to its 
statistical characteristics, as they enable disaggregating the index by population group in 
two terms: between and within groups. For example, it is possible to estimate Theil by 
sex and separate it into two values, one measuring income inequality stemming 
fromdifferences in income between males and females, ceteris paribus, and the other 
one measuring inequality within each group, which in this case refers to factors other 
than the individual’s sex. Adding up these two values provides total Theil index. 
That said, we present next the Theil indexon the basis of the following classifications: 
census area, sex, colour of skin, schooling level, and employment status. For the per 
capita household income we consider the characteristics of the head of the household. 
We point out that the application of this methodology results in greater relative 
importance being assigned to the intra-group component vis-à-vis the inter-group 
component.The explanation for that rests on occupational heterogeneity and personal 
characteristics, which bring about greater income dispersion for members of a same 
category, for example, sex or geographic region.On the other hand, the decomposition 
of the Theil index is influenced by each group’s proportional composition. Therefore, 
Kanbur (2006) suggests that comparison of the two indicators should prioritize their 
concurrent evolution over time rather than only focusing on which intra or inter group 
componentis higher in a given period. 
Table 2 shows the progress of the real income per capita categorized by region and area, 
except the rural North, that was included in the 2004 National Household Survey and 
was excluded from the present sample to maintain the homogeneity of the estimates 
over time. The Northeast is the region with the lowest incomes in the whole period, 
followed closely by the families of the North. Families of the Southeast, South and 
Midwest are at the other extreme; families of the Southeast had the highest income in 
1979, but were overtaken by families in the South and Midwest in mid 2000s. This 
pattern is the same in both rural and in urban areas, although the level of family income 





Table 2 – Average per capita household income by geographic region and area. 
Brazil. 1979-2011 (constant 2012 R$) 
  North* Northeast Southeast South Mid-West 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
1979 558 150 418 348 995 325 823 221 665 
1983 552 153 406 273 798 305 676 326 646 
1989 811 194 509 354 1,123 396 926 487 964 
1993 533 177 457 344 819 454 781 420 744 
1995 652 223 545 389 1,071 412 972 397 855 
1999 587 231 534 412 1,015 425 942 495 844 
2001 598 218 526 424 1,011 464 971 432 893 
2003 530 212 490 423 936 555 912 412 845 
2005 608 242 548 473 1,007 510 991 525 944 
2007 670 290 620 528 1,079 641 1,099 560 1,112 
2009 729 326 696 582 1,137 703 1,168 654 1,158 
2011 796 347 716 645 1,193 767 1,204 685 1,234 
* Rural North excluded. 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
Table 3 presents the Theil index by geographic region and area. We can see that the 
Northeast concentrates the highest degree of income distribution inequality, and the 
lowest drop in inequality, together with the North, including for the 2003-2011 period. 
The South stands out as the country’s least unequal region, having experienced the 
highest decrease in inequality in the recent period, followed by the Southeast. It is worth 
underscoring that inequality fell in all regions over the 1979-2011 period, though more 
concentrated from 2003 to 2011.  
Over the period spanning from 2003 to 2011, where inequality fall is concentrated, the 
decomposition of the index according to the intra and inter group criterion shows that 
intra-region inequality rose while inter-region inequality fell.In other words, average 
income across regions tended to converge. This can be accounted for by the fact that the 
Northeast, North and Mid-West regions exhibited greater economic dynamism and 
greater per capita income growth. In all likelihood, this greater dynamism enabled the 
broadening of income. 
Another key cross section for understanding income inequality differences is that based 
on rural and urban areas.3The table shows a diverging trend between rural and urban 
areas, as the decrease in income inequality was higher in the former than in the latter, a 
trend further accentuated in the post-2003 period. Therefore, income inequality, which 
was already higher in urban areas, became even higher when compared with rural areas.  
3 For the Brazilian case, three categories are worth analysing jointly: metropolitan regions, non-
metropolitan urban areas, and rural areas. However, in order to enable better comparability with India’s 
estimates, we have only considered the urban/rural distribution. 
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This picture might mislead us into believing that the situation of households in the rural 
area is better than that of households in urban areas. Yet, the urban area concentrates 
more complex and dynamic economic activities and labour markets, in addition to better 
housing conditions, access to public services and more job opportunities.4 Moreover, 
the average income in rural areas is significantly lower, while part of the income earned 
there comes from families living in urban areas (Table 2).The precarious situation of the 
rural Northeast and/or North regions is even more serious when we consider low 
accessibility to basic sanitation, health and education services. Thus, relevant as it is, the 
issue of income insufficiency and poor income distribution is just a facet of the 
countless problems faced by the poorest population in these regions (Lemos, 2012). 
Inequality as measured by census area tends to be more and more intra areas, both 
because of the modernization of agribusiness and the greater concentration of poverty in 
urban areas. Concurrently, the inter-area inequality component has lost importance in 
accounting for total evolution of inequality. 
 
Table 3 – Decomposition of Theil index by geographic region and area. Per capita 
household income. Brazil. 1979-2011. 





(%)   Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
1979 0.602 0.370 0.709 0.569 0.602 0.541 0.605 0.347 0.704 82.0 18.0 
1983 0.656 0.456 0.768 0.547 0.611 0.578 0.565 0.695 0.671 85.7 14.3 
1989 0.847 0.678 0.932 0.598 0.881 0.647 0.673 1.124 0.815 88.4 11.6 
1993 0.757 0.609 0.864 0.701 0.674 0.573 0.657 0.763 0.768 90.9 9.1 
1995 0.689 0.597 0.813 0.564 0.648 0.533 0.625 0.660 0.697 88.7 11.3 
1999 0.646 0.636 0.769 0.571 0.619 0.511 0.608 0.735 0.724 89.6 10.4 
2001 0.684 0.484 0.781 0.654 0.629 0.448 0.613 0.619 0.746 90.5 9.5 
2003 0.599 0.435 0.711 0.567 0.615 0.637 0.556 0.484 0.691 90.6 9.4 
2005 0.586 0.433 0.700 0.503 0.594 0.338 0.517 0.573 0.710 90.5 9.5 
2007 0.559 0.420 0.665 0.399 0.540 0.400 0.505 0.443 0.694 90.9 9.1 
2009 0.558 0.409 0.671 0.371 0.524 0.314 0.480 0.517 0.664 91.6 8.4 
2011 0.589 0.426 0.612 0.383 0.522 0.362 0.436 0.365 0.603 91.7 8.3 
* Rural North excluded. 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
2.2. Labour income inequality by worker characteristics 
 
a) Region 
4 Part of this result can be accounted for by the fact that this study, due to its use of the PNAD survey, 
does not consider zero-income households, i.e., those producing for self-consumption, mostly located in 
the rural area. A lower income level and the set of factors mentioned above account for the rural area’s 
low income inequality level. 
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The evolution of labour income by geographical area and census area is presented in 
Table 4 thatdisplays a pattern similar to that seen in the previous section. This result is 
expected because labour income tends to represent two-thirds of the total household 
income in Brazil, therefore the patterns and trends of these two types of income are 
similar. Consequently, workers in the Northeast tend to obtain a wage or a labour 
income less than workers in other regions of the country, especially compared to 
workers of the richest regions. This regional difference is even more remarkable among 
workers in rural areas, demonstrating the plight of workers located in the poorest areas 
of the country. 
 
Table 4 – Average labour income by geographic region and area. 
Brazil. 1979-2011 (constant 2012 R$) 
  North* Northeast Southeast South Mid-West 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Urban Rural Urban Rural 
1979 1,172 363 856 775 1,697 839 1,404 575 1,325 
1983 1,156 332 804 610 1,329 779 1,200 710 1,203 
1989 1,476 437 946 740 1,687 896 1,490 965 1,625 
1993 946 316 745 625 1,284 943 1,235 859 1,246 
1995 1,148 397 864 715 1,626 782 1,491 741 1,370 
1999 1,019 397 838 733 1,523 790 1,391 914 1,318 
2001 1,008 346 803 672 1,482 803 1,306 765 1,336 
2003 861 319 713 690 1,311 908 1,219 719 1,257 
2005 939 338 772 701 1,334 845 1,307 864 1,350 
2007 1,069 410 867 806 1,447 1,027 1,410 868 1,533 
2009 1,117 436 934 828 1,482 1,092 1,487 971 1,562 
2011 1,217 467 1,039 930 1,605 1,141 1,546 1,048 1,722 
* Rural North excluded. 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
Table 5 shows the Theil index for labour income by geographic regions, and confirms 
that in 2011, the Northeast had the highest income inequality and the South, the lowest 
inequality. On the other hand, the Mid-West is the second worst region in terms of 
labour income distribution, further strengthening the hypothesis that the region’s high 
inequality level is due to the agribusiness’s recent expansion model, which contributed 
to widen the wage spectrum. However, unlike per capita household income, we notice 
that the decline is not so sharp in rural areas in comparison with urban areas, such that 
the Theil index tends to converge between these two areas. 
Within each region or census area, internal labour income inequality prevails in 
explaining the level of inequality across census areas and/or geographic regions. We 
recall that the regions with the lowest relative development grow, in the Brazilian case, 
at higher rates than the others, which over time leads to the narrowing of their 
differences in terms of per capita income, yet not necessarily in terms of the income 







Table 5 – Decomposition of Theil index by geographic region and area. Labour income. 
Brazil. 1979-2011. 
  North* Northeast Southeast South Mid-West Within groups Between groups 
  Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban   (%)   (%) 
1979 0.586 0.373 0.669 0.467 0.576 0.481 0.628 0.333 0.681 0.575 (87.2) 0.085 (12.8) 
1983 0.547 0.488 0.716 0.548 0.602 0.542 0.570 0.543 0.654 0.603 (89.8) 0.069 (10.2) 
1989 0.789 0.657 0.977 0.592 0.741 0.607 0.711 0.890 0.875 0.764 (92.2) 0.064 (7.8) 
1993 0.713 0.748 0.852 0.646 0.676 0.658 0.694 0.806 0.769 0.709 (92.8) 0.055 (7.2) 
1995 0.620 0.615 0.743 0.497 0.593 0.462 0.601 0.534 0.642 0.612 (90.6) 0.064 (9.4) 
1999 0.573 0.587 0.704 0.539 0.543 0.515 0.548 0.659 0.675 0.575 (90.9) 0.057 (9.1) 
2001 0.585 0.482 0.677 0.556 0.581 0.517 0.535 0.532 0.673 0.590 (91.6) 0.054 (8.4) 
2003 0.540 0.397 0.646 0.601 0.559 0.579 0.526 0.418 0.607 0.565 (91.8) 0.050 (8.2) 
2005 0.500 0.412 0.655 0.469 0.551 0.401 0.517 0.539 0.646 0.556 (92.2) 0.047 (7.8) 
2007 0.502 0.491 0.628 0.423 0.503 0.540 0.476 0.438 0.634 0.525 (92.8) 0.040 (7.2) 
2009 0.482 0.444 0.590 0.339 0.515 0.379 0.473 0.452 0.604 0.515 (93.3) 0.037 (6.7) 
2011 0.491 0.415 0.565 0.361 0.478 0.476 0.413 0.367 0.573 0.487 (93.6) 0.034 (6.4) 
* Rural North excluded. 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
b) Gender 
Difference in income by gender remains significant in Brazil, though, it has been 
decreasing over time in both rural and urban areas (Table 6). Whereas in 1979 women 
were paid about 50 % of men’s income, in 2011 they received 73% of male income. It is 
noteworthy that several studies show that this differential of labour income is resulting 
mainly from discriminatory practices and segregation in the labour market, and not due 
to differences in productive attributes betweensexes. This aspect is relevant, because 
since the mid-1980s women have exceeded men in terms of average years of schooling, 
however, many of them remain employed in jobs with lower pay and / or lower social 
prestige. 
Table 6 – Average labour income by sex and area. 
Brazil. 1979-2011 (constant 2012 R$) 
  rural urban total 
  male female male female male female 
1979 702 311 1,805 831 1,463 736 
1983 587 252 1,453 709 1,209 631 
1989 749 334 1,820 956 1,550 870 
1993 629 301 1,373 774 1,216 717 
1995 643 375 1,674 979 1,459 912 
1999 647 435 1,531 992 1,347 927 
2001 599 385 1,474 968 1,329 919 
2003 611 375 1,323 871 1,207 832 
2005 630 424 1,374 926 1,241 881 
2007 736 506 1,508 1,020 1,378 977 
2009 765 567 1,567 1,058 1,435 1,016 
2011 825 585 1,671 1,182 1,547 1,135 
20 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
Table 7 shows that the classification by sex is critical for understanding labour income 
inequality. The estimates show a reduction in this form of inequality for both groups, 
especially for the case of male workers, although women’s rates remained at a lower 
level as a result of a lower wage dispersion associated with lower wages relative to the 
male workforce. It is worth stressing that most women earn lower-than-minimum 
wages. Besides, the weight of the male/female gap to account for labour income 
inequality has fallen over time, thus increasing the importance of intragroup inequality. 
Moreover, the drop in labour income inequality between groups was more remarkable 
in the early 1980s, corresponding to the massive entrance of women in the labour 
market. 
These findings show the difficulties women face in the Brazilian labour market, which 
prompt lower inequality between them. In the case of men, we can see that the higher 
wages– well above those of women – stagnated while the lowest wages recovered due 
to the effect of the minimum wage – around which men’s, rather than women’s, floor 
wages tend to gravitate. 
It is worth pointing out that the average wage gap between men and women, in favour 
of the former and which was 45%, fell to 36% from 2003 to 2011, which suggests an 
increase in women occupational groups whose wages are adjusted by the minimum 





Table7 – Decomposition of Theil index by sex and area. Labour income. Brazil. 1979-2011. 
    Theil index Within-group Between-group 
    male female   %   % 
Rural 
1979 0.460 0.407 0.455 92.5 0.037 7.5 
1983 0.565 0.427 0.550 92.8 0.043 7.2 
1989 0.665 0.593 0.656 93.9 0.043 6.1 
1993 0.747 0.806 0.754 95.4 0.037 4.6 
1995 0.555 0.649 0.569 96.4 0.021 3.6 
1999 0.598 0.629 0.603 97.9 0.013 2.1 
2001 0.588 0.482 0.570 97.4 0.015 2.6 
2003 0.630 0.412 0.595 97.1 0.018 2.9 
2005 0.502 0.467 0.496 97.5 0.013 2.5 
2007 0.551 0.426 0.527 97.9 0.012 2.1 
2009 0.451 0.420 0.444 98.3 0.008 1.7 
2011 0.498 0.448 0.487 97.9 0.010 2.1 
Urban 
1979 0.587 0.498 0.570 91.5 0.053 8.5 
1983 0.594 0.531 0.581 92.4 0.048 7.6 
1989 0.767 0.723 0.756 94.8 0.041 5.2 
1993 0.720 0.629 0.697 95.3 0.034 4.7 
1995 0.625 0.582 0.613 95.2 0.031 4.8 
1999 0.585 0.566 0.579 96.5 0.021 3.5 
2001 0.612 0.571 0.599 96.8 0.020 3.2 
2003 0.593 0.534 0.574 96.7 0.020 3.3 
2005 0.582 0.543 0.569 97.0 0.018 3.0 
2007 0.549 0.495 0.531 96.8 0.018 3.2 
2009 0.548 0.479 0.524 96.7 0.018 3.3 
2011 0.503 0.468 0.491 97.2 0.014 2.8 
Total 
1979 0.638 0.537 0.620 94.0 0.039 6.0 
1983 0.650 0.570 0.635 94.4 0.037 5.6 
1989 0.801 0.756 0.790 96.1 0.032 3.9 
1993 0.759 0.666 0.737 96.3 0.028 3.7 
1995 0.668 0.612 0.653 96.6 0.023 3.4 
1999 0.628 0.592 0.618 97.6 0.015 2.4 
2001 0.647 0.587 0.629 97.7 0.015 2.3 
2003 0.624 0.546 0.600 97.5 0.015 2.5 
2005 0.606 0.556 0.590 97.8 0.013 2.2 
2007 0.575 0.505 0.552 97.6 0.013 2.4 
2009 0.564 0.487 0.539 97.5 0.014 2.5 
2011 0.525 0.479 0.509 97.9 0.011 2.1 







The reduction of the gap on the employee's race is shown in Table 8, however, although 
at a slower pace compare with women. In 1979 the non- white workers were paid 46 % 
of the white’s income and in 2011 the gap increased to 60 %. However, opposing to the 
situation for women, non-whites tend to have lower levels of schooling than whites, 
which is reflected in the lower level of remuneration for these workers 
 
Table 8 – Average labour income by race and area. 
Brazil. 1979-2011 (constant 2012 R$) 
  rural urban total 
  non-white white non-white white non-white white 
1989 468 851 901 1,893 785 1,705 
1993 362 787 724 1,441 641 1,348 
1995 420 771 881 1,763 781 1,625 
1999 417 801 836 1,651 745 1,530 
2001 394 735 816 1,600 746 1,506 
2003 377 786 743 1,442 683 1,374 
2005 465 751 811 1,499 749 1,417 
2007 529 896 917 1,634 852 1,556 
2009 560 946 996 1,672 926 1,597 
2011 615 976 1,098 1,806 1,030 1,728 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
The cross section color of skin is equally important in the Brazilian labour market. 
Table 9 shows the Theil indices according to this classification, and in it we can see that 
white workers, in addition to presenting lower labour income inequality levels, also 
experienced a higher reduction of this indicator between 1989 and 2011. However, from 
2003 to 2011, inequality among blacks fell more than among whites. 
In terms of comparison between both groups’ average labour income, the difference in 
favour of the whites, which was two times higher than the blacks’ average, was down to 
67% over the same period, which indicates a stronger growth of black people’s average 
income, including for those lower income strata, despite the still high inequality 
indicator within this group.  
We have noticed, thus, that the colour of the skin is more important than sex for both 
household and labour income inequality. Among others, Cacciamali & Tatei (2012) 
show that women and black or brown individuals historically suffer from inequality of 
opportunities in Brazil. In the case of women, they managed to overcome the access 
barriers to the educational system and today boast an average schooling level that is 
higher than that of men; however, this educational gain does is not reflected in the 
labour market. Yet, in the case of black individuals, the problem is pre-labour market 
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discrimination. On average, this population group has lower schooling levels than 
whites, with negative implications for wages earned. Thus, black women in Brazil are 
the most harmed, since they are doubly discriminated against. 
 
Table9 – Decomposition of Theil index by race and area. Labour income. Brazil. 1989-
2011. 
    Theil index Within-group Between-group 
    non-white white  %  % 
Rural 
1989 0.619 0.678 0.655 93.8 0.044 6.2 
1993 0.640 0.762 0.718 90.7 0.073 9.3 
1995 0.523 0.558 0.544 92.3 0.046 7.7 
1999 0.431 0.645 0.564 91.6 0.052 8.4 
2001 0.432 0.607 0.538 91.9 0.048 8.1 
2003 0.369 0.656 0.546 89.2 0.066 10.8 
2005 0.424 0.532 0.480 94.4 0.028 5.6 
2007 0.398 0.597 0.504 93.6 0.035 6.4 
2009 0.368 0.464 0.418 92.4 0.034 7.6 
2011 0.464 0.478 0.471 94.7 0.027 5.3 
Urban 
1989 0.700 0.754 0.742 93.0 0.056 7.0 
1993 0.574 0.718 0.681 93.1 0.050 6.9 
1995 0.524 0.617 0.593 92.1 0.051 7.9 
1999 0.469 0.580 0.551 91.8 0.049 8.2 
2001 0.474 0.606 0.570 92.1 0.049 7.9 
2003 0.447 0.585 0.545 91.8 0.049 8.2 
2005 0.441 0.591 0.544 92.6 0.043 7.4 
2007 0.421 0.553 0.509 92.9 0.039 7.1 
2009 0.474 0.530 0.510 94.1 0.032 5.9 
2011 0.393 0.523 0.475 94.1 0.030 5.9 
Total 
1989 0.721 0.780 0.765 92.3 0.063 7.7 
1993 0.614 0.738 0.705 92.2 0.060 7.8 
1995 0.558 0.640 0.618 91.4 0.058 8.6 
1999 0.495 0.607 0.577 91.1 0.056 8.9 
2001 0.496 0.625 0.589 91.6 0.054 8.4 
2003 0.463 0.601 0.561 91.1 0.055 8.9 
2005 0.457 0.603 0.556 92.1 0.047 7.9 
2007 0.435 0.568 0.523 92.4 0.043 7.6 
2009 0.481 0.537 0.517 93.5 0.036 6.5 
2011 0.414 0.532 0.488 93.8 0.032 6.2 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
d) Education 
Table 10 shows the progress of labour income according to the workers’ educational 
level and here it is one of the main factors that influence inequality in Brazil: the high-
income gap between workers with higher education and workers with all other levels. In 
2011, workers with higher education earnings were, on average, 2.6 times the income of 
workers with high school, and even with the average income downward trend of skilled 




Table 10 – Average labour income by education and area. 
Brazil. 1979-2011 (constant 2012 R$) 




Primary Secondary Higher 
Rural 
1979 435 715 1,087 1,704 5,548 
1983 350 583 875 1,169 2,675 
1989 404 707 983 1,189 3,090 
1993 336 577 853 1,182 2,999 
1995 359 587 793 1,264 3,767 
1999 338 559 744 1,236 4,147 
2001 336 549 689 1,067 2,669 
2003 331 547 709 905 2,631 
2005 362 551 654 937 2,516 
2007 432 639 752 976 2,083 
2009 446 648 791 987 1,817 
2011 509 710 844 989 1,720 
Urban 
1979 615 1,070 1,547 2,446 5,741 
1983 474 826 1,263 1,578 3,534 
1989 525 941 1,404 1,890 4,381 
1993 445 714 1,030 1,657 3,964 
1995 548 872 1,230 1,942 4,769 
1999 510 791 1,039 1,651 4,195 
2001 498 737 972 1,513 4,151 
2003 447 663 825 1,274 3,539 
2005 481 696 833 1,273 3,526 
2007 569 773 911 1,319 3,628 
2009 600 783 922 1,329 3,523 
2011 780 882 1,002 1,382 3,643 
Total 
1979 514 979 1,521 2,417 5,737 
1983 409 767 1,239 1,558 3,520 
1989 466 886 1,365 1,846 4,354 
1993 398 687 1,018 1,635 3,942 
1995 467 816 1,200 1,908 4,749 
1999 435 740 1,015 1,629 4,194 
2001 439 703 954 1,497 4,132 
2003 403 641 816 1,259 3,525 
2005 434 664 816 1,256 3,509 
2007 517 744 895 1,300 3,595 
2009 542 754 909 1,308 3,470 
2011 699 845 986 1,362 3,593 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
On Table 11, we notice a labour income inequality converging movement between the 
various schooling levels, signalling that labour income distribution for individuals with 
incomplete elementary schooling up to complete middle education tends to be similar, 
besides having dropped most dramatically between 2003 and 2011. Over the period 
labour demand tended to be concentrated in these two groupings, whose income was 




Table11 – Decomposition of Theil index by education. Labour income. Brazil. 1979-2011. 
    Theil index Within-group Between-group 






Primary Secondary Higher   %   % 
Rural 
1979 0.331 0.451 0.500 0.451 0.476 0.416 84.7 0.075 15.3 
1983 0.412 0.554 0.458 0.793 0.598 0.524 88.5 0.068 11.5 
1989 0.532 0.669 0.523 0.552 0.563 0.619 88.6 0.080 11.4 
1993 0.672 0.707 0.796 0.738 0.397 0.696 88.0 0.095 12.0 
1995 0.388 0.517 0.446 0.529 0.443 0.483 81.9 0.107 18.1 
1999 0.348 0.485 0.472 0.531 0.504 0.468 76.0 0.148 24.0 
2001 0.379 0.556 0.449 0.527 0.511 0.509 86.9 0.077 13.1 
2003 0.377 0.536 0.621 0.551 0.768 0.534 87.2 0.078 12.8 
2005 0.370 0.450 0.442 0.437 0.554 0.440 86.5 0.069 13.5 
2007 0.388 0.495 0.566 0.507 0.402 0.489 90.8 0.050 9.2 
2009 0.423 0.404 0.433 0.377 0.364 0.402 88.8 0.051 11.2 
2011 0.641 0.425 0.491 0.403 0.426 0.461 92.6 0.037 7.4 
Urban 
1979 0.383 0.455 0.432 0.408 0.382 0.423 67.9 0.200 32.1 
1983 0.378 0.480 0.467 0.450 0.398 0.445 70.7 0.185 29.3 
1989 0.521 0.636 0.556 0.621 0.534 0.588 73.7 0.210 26.3 
1993 0.459 0.496 0.501 0.522 0.551 0.516 70.6 0.215 29.4 
1995 0.410 0.452 0.426 0.453 0.395 0.432 67.1 0.212 32.9 
1999 0.334 0.397 0.401 0.440 0.361 0.398 66.3 0.202 33.7 
2001 0.344 0.380 0.408 0.438 0.408 0.409 66.1 0.210 33.9 
2003 0.343 0.371 0.396 0.423 0.387 0.396 66.6 0.198 33.4 
2005 0.335 0.370 0.375 0.418 0.424 0.403 68.6 0.185 31.4 
2007 0.343 0.357 0.348 0.358 0.431 0.379 69.1 0.169 30.9 
2009 0.317 0.319 0.330 0.354 0.464 0.381 70.3 0.161 29.7 
2011 0.346 0.296 0.303 0.333 0.441 0.360 71.4 0.145 28.6 
Total 
1979 0.373 0.468 0.437 0.411 0.383 0.430 65.3 0.229 34.7 
1983 0.405 0.504 0.470 0.464 0.401 0.460 68.5 0.212 31.6 
1989 0.514 0.627 0.539 0.621 0.536 0.584 71.0 0.238 29.0 
1993 0.546 0.535 0.518 0.531 0.549 0.535 70.0 0.229 30.0 
1995 0.423 0.472 0.432 0.459 0.396 0.442 65.4 0.234 34.6 
1999 0.359 0.421 0.409 0.445 0.365 0.408 64.5 0.225 35.5 
2001 0.370 0.411 0.412 0.442 0.410 0.418 65.0 0.225 35.0 
2003 0.364 0.400 0.412 0.429 0.392 0.407 66.1 0.208 33.9 
2005 0.356 0.388 0.382 0.420 0.426 0.408 67.6 0.196 32.4 
2007 0.366 0.385 0.367 0.366 0.433 0.390 68.9 0.176 31.1 
2009 0.360 0.337 0.340 0.358 0.467 0.386 69.8 0.167 30.2 
2011 0.426 0.323 0.320 0.338 0.445 0.371 71.2 0.150 28.8 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
The exceptions are the extremities, those without education and those with complete 
higher education, who have the highest Theil indices for the education categories and 
also follow a pattern of increased inequality growth between 2003 and 2011.  
In the first case, the worsening of the inequality index is related to the fact that the 
group of occupied workers without education has been falling dramatically, creating a 
huge gap between those earning the minimum wage and those earning meagre incomes. 
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And, in the case of the occupied with higher education, pay heterogeneity is accounted 
for not only by their educational background, but also by their market valuing. As much 
as demand for this form of labour has increased, this has occurred in a much segmented 
way. Although the average income gap between those occupied workers with higher 
education and those without any education was fivefold in 2011, it was 8.7 times higher 
in 2003; and while the first group saw their real average income stagnate, the second 
saw it rise by 70%. 
 
e) Status of work 
Finally, Table 12 shows the evolution of labour income by status of work, in which we 
observed the reduction in income differential of informal workers - unregistered and 
self-employed - and domestic workers comparatively to formal employees. Because 
these workers are the majority in the labour market, this drop contributed to the overall 
reduction in inequality of labour income, even though there has been increased gap in 
relative to employers and public servants. 
 
Table 12 – Average labour income by work status and area. 

















1993 687 270 623 2,106 839 215 
1995 736 362 552 2,155 973 277 
1999 784 366 518 2,480 1,095 303 
2001 679 366 510 1,955 834 298 
2003 664 355 510 2,427 797 311 
2005 769 393 507 2,013 924 324 
2007 872 444 655 2,194 1,000 359 
2009 914 470 649 2,337 1,081 407 
2011 944 551 694 2,592 1,076 410 
Urban 
1993 1,284 574 1,025 3,766 1,580 274 
1995 1,451 730 1,331 4,742 1,950 391 
1999 1,376 757 1,191 4,097 1,996 409 
2001 1,312 773 1,134 4,016 2,031 402 
2003 1,189 673 978 3,547 1,835 372 
2005 1,222 739 990 3,664 1,967 396 
2007 1,299 804 1,154 3,960 2,252 448 
2009 1,345 865 1,101 3,846 2,377 485 
2011 1,405 949 1,366 4,421 2,517 552 
Urban 
1993 1,232 487 911 3,535 1,537 268 
1995 1,388 635 1,113 4,400 1,890 378 
1999 1,318 662 1,012 3,897 1,926 395 
2001 1,271 695 995 3,782 1,971 393 
2003 1,155 616 873 3,438 1,783 366 
2005 1,189 669 876 3,473 1,905 388 
2007 1,268 733 1,041 3,788 2,175 439 
2009 1,314 786 1,002 3,704 2,282 477 
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2011 1,379 878 1,219 4,253 2,422 539 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
Table 13 presents a decomposition of the Theil index by occupied worker status.In it we 
see a decrease in labour income inequality for all occupational categories, especially 
among wage earners. Between 1993 and 2011, there was a -39.6% drop in the Theil 
coefficient for those registered wage earners against a -29.4% decrease for non-
registered wage earners. It is worth mentioning a minor reduction (-12.3% over the 
period) in the Theil index among employers, which was offset by a rebound in the 
2003-2011 period. In 2011, this category had the highest “labour income” inequality 
gap. This is not a surprising finding if one considers that employers tend to have the 
highest educational levels and the highest average incomes. Still, they are also 
characterized by the high heterogeneity of their market structures, ranging from 
capitalist businesspeople to microentrepreneurs with extremely low “profitability” rates, 
often close to the average income of those self-employed. It is also worth noting the 
high inequality level among this last group of workers, also prompted by the group’s 
extreme heterogeneity. Also worthy of mention is the fact that this group had the second 
highest average income rise between 2003 and 2011, only trailing behind non-registered 





Table13 – Decomposition of Theil index by work status. Labour income. Brazil.  
1993-2011. 
    Theil index Within-group Between-group 













workers   %   % 
Rural 
1993 0.391 0.398 0.822 0.800 0.569 0.290 0.640 81.0 0.151 19.0 
1995 0.326 0.272 0.616 0.566 0.539 0.200 0.470 79.7 0.119 20.3 
1999 0.333 0.293 0.585 0.667 0.525 0.198 0.469 76.1 0.147 23.9 
2001 0.167 0.295 0.653 0.758 0.391 0.226 0.473 80.9 0.112 19.1 
2003 0.154 0.259 0.597 0.914 0.288 0.215 0.470 76.8 0.142 23.2 
2005 0.183 0.241 0.552 0.651 0.391 0.221 0.397 78.0 0.112 22.0 
2007 0.194 0.246 0.738 0.579 0.254 0.238 0.453 84.1 0.085 15.9 
2009 0.141 0.235 0.578 0.534 0.255 0.235 0.359 79.4 0.093 20.6 
2011 0.125 0.273 0.653 0.707 0.268 0.231 0.420 84.4 0.078 15.6 
Urban 
1993 0.547 0.697 0.675 0.616 0.524 0.240 0.586 80.2 0.144 19.8 
1995 0.468 0.544 0.602 0.455 0.475 0.221 0.496 77.1 0.147 22.9 
1999 0.422 0.523 0.581 0.480 0.419 0.200 0.469 78.1 0.131 21.9 
2001 0.434 0.559 0.618 0.507 0.421 0.193 0.488 78.8 0.131 21.2 
2003 0.406 0.481 0.618 0.498 0.406 0.190 0.462 77.9 0.132 22.1 
2005 0.376 0.485 0.618 0.557 0.417 0.173 0.459 78.2 0.128 21.8 
2007 0.352 0.452 0.575 0.499 0.435 0.178 0.431 78.5 0.118 21.5 
2009 0.335 0.606 0.533 0.499 0.418 0.182 0.427 78.8 0.115 21.2 
2011 0.338 0.424 0.501 0.550 0.427 0.167 0.407 80.6 0.098 19.4 
Urban 
1993 0.551 0.695 0.725 0.647 0.533 0.247 0.608 79.5 0.157 20.5 
1995 0.474 0.540 0.660 0.486 0.486 0.224 0.521 77.0 0.156 23.0 
1999 0.427 0.529 0.631 0.505 0.433 0.204 0.491 77.5 0.142 22.5 
2001 0.434 0.563 0.661 0.539 0.432 0.198 0.506 78.7 0.137 21.3 
2003 0.404 0.480 0.643 0.532 0.413 0.193 0.476 77.4 0.139 22.6 
2005 0.373 0.480 0.640 0.577 0.426 0.179 0.469 77.7 0.134 22.3 
2007 0.348 0.449 0.621 0.515 0.441 0.185 0.444 78.5 0.121 21.5 
2009 0.329 0.584 0.559 0.509 0.426 0.189 0.433 78.3 0.120 21.7 
2011 0.333 0.424 0.549 0.567 0.436 0.174 0.420 80.7 0.100 19.3 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
* Codification for work status in 1979to 1989 was different than today. In the total wage earners’ subset for that 
period were included, among others, occupations like civil servants and domestic labourers, occupations which would 




3. Wage inequality in Brazil 
 
The rising minimum wage, in the context of job creation and increasing formalization of 
wage work, brought about a convergence of wage levels between and within the 
economic sectors, regions and social groups. The changes were rather dramatic over a 
short period of time, from 2001 to 2011, even though the trend can be traced back to 
1995, when the purchasing power of the minimum wage started to increase. The 
minimum wage was equivalent to 45.8 percent of the average wage in 2013, compared 
with 29.7 percent in 1999 (Graph 11). 
Given that the ratio of minimum wage to average wage is difficult to compare between 
employment groups, it is best to analyze how this ratio changes within each group over 
time. So, when we break down wages by type of employment – registered and 
unregistered– the minimum wage is much closer to the average wage for informal (i.e. 
unregistered) employees, especially in rural areas, since average wages for these 
workers are much lower than in formal employment.  
 
Graph 11 – Ratio of minimum to average wages. Brazil, 1999-2013. 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on PNAD microdata. 
 
Graph 12, which shows inequality trends for wages, labour incomes and per capita 
household income, demonstrates that declining wage inequality was the main factor 
driving overall reductions in income inequality, as the fall in inequality was greater for 
wages than for labour income (which includes self-employed incomes) and per capita 
household income (which includes pensions, social assistance benefits and cash 
transfer). This means that Brazil’s minimum wage policy played a more central role in 
30 
 
reducing inequality and as we will analyze below, the role of labour market was more 
important than the country’s income transfer programs during the first decade of the 
century.  
There is a main characteristic of the Brazilian labour market that we must mention. In 
Brazil, the minimum wage is fully enforced among registered workers and it is used as a 
standard for unregistered wage earners too because of the Labour Court. The 
unregistered have access only indirectly in case they appeal to the Labour Courts, as the 
Constitution states these rights should be applied to all wage earners, so if the Labour 
Court sues the employer, he shall pay all bypassed social rights plus a fine. To avoid 
higher costs if caught, most of those employers will closely follow labour laws and 
minimum payment. This is demonstrated by the even faster decline of wage inequality 
among unregistered wage earners in the period 2005-2011 (Graph 13). Also, there is 
another reason. In a booming labour market, compounded by high turnover rates, 
paying minimum wage has become almost a requirement in order to recruit less skilled 
but specialized workers.  
 
Graph 12: Theil indexes for different types of income. Brazil, 1995 to 2001 
 





Graph 13: Theil indexes for registered and nonregistered wage earners. Brazil, 
1995 to 2001 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on PNAD microdata. 
 
It should be said, from the outset, that falling wage inequality occurs in a context of 
very diverse levels of productivity across and within economic sectors. Nevertheless, 
wage inequality has fallen in all sectors and most rapidly for construction and services, 
sectors. In these sectors, average wages are not much above minimum wages, so a rise 
in the minimum significantly compresses the wage scale.  
In manufacturing, by contrast, most workers are paid far above the minimum wage and 
the wage scale is much wider, so the fall in wage inequality was less compared to 
workers in construction, which are more likely to receive wages at the minimum wage 
level. In agriculture, an altogether different trend can be observed. Because the 
minimum wage is close to the highest wages in this sector, clearly the rising minimum 
wage had little impact here at least in terms of inequality reduction (graph 14). 
Another point, not shown in the graph, is that the gap between the wages of informal 
and formal employees (unregistered and registered) narrowed in all sectors. The same is 
true of the gap between average wages in lower-paying and lower-productivity sectors 





Graph 14: Theil indexes for wage earners by economic sectors. Brazil, 1995 to 2001 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on PNAD microdata. 
 
It is also worth mentioning that wage inequality fell most significantly among almost all 
disadvantaged groups – especially non-whites and the less educated – and also among 
women (Table 14). The minimum wage is behind this change as these groups have more 
wage earners receiving a labour income around the minimum wage as well as less 
workers earning an income of at least 3 times this value. In the case of women, the 
growth of jobs was more concentrated at both ends of the wage scale than for men. 
However, the female to male wage ratio, at over 80 percent, was much better than that 
between non-whites and whites, even though the latter increased from 55 to 66 percent 
in 2011. 
Considering education, wage premiums have fallen for all schooling levels, which is 
related both to the minimum wage’s influence and to an abundance of workers with 
secondary and tertiary education in a context in which productivity has remained 
stagnant. The wages of illiterate wage earners were 10 times lower than those for 
workers with college education in 2001, but this figure fell to just 4.2 times in 2011. 
The change is staggering even considering the fact that the size of the first group 
dropped sharply while the size of the second grew dramatically. 
In terms of the regional differences, there was a remarkable shift. The Northeast region 
saw the largest decline in inequality during the period 1995-2011. On the other hand, in 
the Southeast the reduction in inequality was less dramatic. While the Northeast was the 





Table 14 – Theil indexes, values and variation, and ratio of average wages. Brazil 
(2001/2011) 




wages 2011 ratios 
male 0.529 0.378 -28.6 85.5 83.4 
female/male 
female 0.451 0.388 -22.9   
whites 0.514 0.41 -20.3 55.2 65.9 
non-whites/whites 
non-whites 0.351 0.251 -28.5   
Without 
instruction 0.218 0.194 -10.8 - - - 
Incomplete 
Primary 0.233 0.156 -32.9 - - - 
Complete 
Primary 0.258 0.166 -35.5 79.8 91.2 
incomplete/ 
complete primary 
Secondary 0.337 0.229 -32 65.9 75.1 primary/ secondary 
Tertiary 0.403 0.404 0.1 32.9 38.7 secondary/tertiary 
North 0,467 0,320 -31,5 71,3 82,1 Northeast /  North 
Northeast 0,525 0,336 -35,9 - - - 
Southeast 0,490 0,383 -21,9 50,3 58,6 Northeast / Southeast 
South 0,393 0,258 -34,4 60,8 66,3 Northeast /  South 
Mid-West 0,459 0,357 -22,3 62,8 64,0 Northeast /  Mid-West 





4. Regression-based inequality decomposition 
 
This section presents an econometric exercise based on the methodology proposed by 
Morduch and Sicular (2002) and Fields (2002), which seeks to measure income 
inequality determinants. Succinctly, the method is based on the Mincer earnings 
function and, building on OLS-estimated coefficients,5 we calculate the effects of each 
explanatory variable on the distribution of the dependent variable. In the case of Brazil, 
results were estimated for three variables of interest: labour income, wages and per 
capita expenditure, all measured in log units. 
The first variable includes all occupied workers in Brazil, provided they earn some form 
of income, i.e., unpaid workers and those working for self-consumption are not 
included. The second variable only considers wage earners, with or without a work 
contract, so as to verify whether the pattern changes when separating private sector 
employees from all other occupational groups. Both variables relied on 5-year PNAD 
household surveys: 1995, 1999, 2005, 2009 and 2011. Lastly, we use the 2008/009 
Household Budget Survey (POF, from the Portuguese acronym) in estimating 
household monthly per capita expenditure, excluding variations in asset ownership. 
In labour income and wage regressions, the results for the vectors education, work type, 
economic sector, occupational group and geographical region are calculated on the basis 
of the sum of the individual effects of each binary variable modelled, while the 
reference categories are, respectively, education – higher education; work type – wage 
earner with a work contract; economic sector – manufacturing industry; occupational 
group– sciences and arts professionals; and region – Southeast. In the case of per capita 
expenditure, the vectors of interest are the characteristics of the reference person in each 
household on the basis of race, education, work type and economic sector; in addition to 
household characteristics, such as locality and whether place of residence is one’s own 
or rented.  
Graph 15 presents the results of the decomposition of labour income, with categories 
organized from the lowest contribution percentage to the highest as for 2011. For every 
year, the residual percentage is significantly higher than that for all other components, 
rising steadily over time from 46.4% in 1995 to 51.4% in 2011. We may thus say that 
factors not captured by the model explain about half of labour income inequality in 
2011 and, therefore, we can state that inequality comprises a set of complex, and 
difficult to measure, structural relations. Albeit high, this result is consistent with the 
literature, as residual percentages are 46% in the U.S. (Fields, 2002), 40% in Chile 
(Contreras, 2003) and 57% in Brazil (Araújo & Vasconcellos, 2014). 
5 Assuming the endogeneity problem of the explanatory variable education in relation to the dependent 
variable, the usual way out of this problem is by means of the instrumental variables method. However, 
except for a few supplements, the PNAD does not provide sufficient data to ensure the reliability of the 
method. Thus, though widely acknowledged, many studies in Brazil prefer to disregard this problem due 
to its operational limitation. 
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Upon considering the variables modelled totalling 100%, we observe that education is 
the main component for explaining labour income inequality in Brazil, accounting for 
31.4% of inequality in 2011. Moreover, observation of the 1995/2009 period shows a 
slight decrease in this percentage, from 35.0% to 29.0%, resulting from the rapid 
expansion of basic education with the adoption of the 1988 Federal Constitution and the 
subsequent increase of the Brazilian workers’ average schooling. With a more educated 
population, there was a flattening of the income of the better educated workers during 
the economic growth period, while the income of those with poorer formal educational 
backgrounds rises substantially. 
After education, the second most important component for explaining labour income 
inequality is work type, with a percentage of 20.9% in 2011. In contrast with education, 
the explanatory portion of occupation showed a fluctuating trend over the period, rising 
from 1995 to 2005 and dropping thereafter. Likewise, occupational groupsaccounted for 
20.5% of labour income inequality in 2011. Jointly, these two variables reflect the 
changes in the Brazilian labour market, especially the rise in formalization in the 2000s 
and the significant rise in the generation of, albeit low-productivity, jobs. 
The sum total of all other components only accounts for 27.2% of labour income 
inequality in 2011 and, except for age, all of them follow a declining trend as regards 
their influence on the level of inequality. It is interesting to observe how certain 
personal characteristics, such as sex and colour, have little influence on income 
inequality, regardless of their relevance in determining wages. These findings indicate 
that intragroup inequality is increasingly more significant than inequality between 
groups, even for those socially vulnerable. 
 
Graph 15 - Determinants of labour income inequality. Brazil. 1995-2011 
 




Disaggregating the results for urban and rural areas (Graphs 16 and 17), we notice that 
the urban pattern is similar to that verified for total country results, which should be 
expected given the country’s high urbanization rate. Rural areas, in contrast, exhibit 
quite different results. 
Firstly, the regional factor is critical for labour income inequality in rural areas, 
accounting for 33% in 2011. This high contribution is even more puzzling because, in 
1995, regional gaps accounted for only 18.9% of labour income inequality; which is 
likely to be a reflection of the high economic growth rate in localities where 
agribusiness prospered over the past years. Next, the work type contributes with 25.1% 
of rural inequality, while the various occupational groups account for only 5.4%. This 
occurs because the labour market in the countryside is largely informal and less 
diversified, with a greater concentration in just a few occupations. Education appears as 
the third factor most contributing to inequality, 13.4% in 2011, indicating that schooling 
differences are relatively less important in explaining income inequality in the 
countryside than in the cities. Also noteworthy is the high contribution percentage of 
sex-related differences, of 10.6% in 2011, in contrast with 19.1% in 1995, which 
represents a considerable gain in favour of women from rural areas. 
 
Graph 16 - Determinants of labour income inequality, Brazil, urban area, 1995-2011 
 





Graph 17 - Determinants of labour income inequality, Brazil, rural area, 1995-2011 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
Next, Graph 18 shows estimates based on the application of the same method to private-
sector employees, with findings similar to those of total occupied workers. Residual 
percentage is prevalent and rising over time, going from 45.8% in 1995 to 49.9% in 
2011. These values are lower than those of labour income, showing that factors not 
included in the model have a relatively lower weight in explaining inequality in wage 
distribution. Once again only considering features included in the model, education 
proves to be a relatively more significant component by accounting for 30.3% of wage 
inequality in 2011, followed by differences in occupational group (24.3%). Differences 
between contract/noncontract wage earners account for approximately 15.6% of 
inequality. 
The remaining components accounted for 29.8% of wage inequality in 2011, a similar 
level to that estimated for labour income, yet with a different variable ordering. Age has 
a higher percentage in income inequality (10%), reflecting the greater importance of 
professional background in determining employee wages than of the other work types, 
especially in the late 2000s, while sex is a less relevant characteristic to explain wage 
inequality than labour income, each contributing, respectively, with 3.1% and 6.3%. In 
relative terms, the workers’ race has a similar influence on labour income and wage 
inequality – 2.9% and 2.5% in 2011. 
These results signal that the behaviour of the main explanatory variables is analogous 
both for wage distribution and labour income, highlighting the significant effect of 
education and of the occupational group on the level of inequality as, by neglecting the 
residual effect, these two variables would account for little over half of total income and 
wage inequality. In turn, differences related to the work type are more relevant to labour 
income than to wages, an expected result since nearly half of total occupied workers in 




Graph 18 - Determinants of wages inequality. Brazil. 1995-2011 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
Disaggregating the estimates resulting from the decomposition of wage inequality into 
urban and rural areas shows similar patterns to those found for labour income, 
especially in urban areas (graph 19). In contrast, in rural areas (graph 20) we notice that 
the contribution of work type, which in this case refers to contract/noncontract work, is 
prevalent, accounting for 39.2% of wage inequality in 2011. Next, regional differences 
account for 23.9%, occupational groups for 10.5% and economic sectors for 9.7%. 
Education only appears after those four sets of variables, contributing with 9.6% of 
wage inequality. 
These results indicate that the pattern of wage inequality is quite different in areas with 
a limited and less dynamic labour market. In rural areas of Brazil, employment 
characteristics are more relevant than individual characteristics. These results also 






Graph 19 - Determinants of wages inequality, Brazil, urban, 1995-2011 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
Graph 20 - Determinants of wages inequality, Brazil, rural 1995-2011 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
Lastly, in Graph 21 we see the results of the estimation of per capita expenditure in 
Brazil in 2008/2009. If compared with previous estimates, the residual percentage is 
significantly higher, especially in rural households, where it is 70.6%. This indicates 
that inequality in household expenditure distribution presents more complex features 
than those shown by labour income regression, and which were not captured by the 
model. 
However, even in this case education proves to be a critical factor in explaining 
household expenditure, accounting for 59.5% of inequality in urban areas, whereas 
characteristics of the head of the household are relatively less significant than region of 
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domicile. Conversely, in rural areas education accounts for only 24.7% of inequality, 
while regional differences represent 30.6% of inequality. This indicates that, in areas 
where labour relations are less dynamic, the role of education on household expenditure 
distribution tends to be less significant. 
Also outstanding is the high contribution of the race of the head of the household, which 
is even higher than that of work type for urban areas. That is, differences across social 
groups are more significant to explaining household expenditure inequality distribution 
than labour market remuneration. This indicates that non-white households are in an 
unprecedented situation of social and economic vulnerability in terms of the labour 
market. We may, thus, assume that segmentation against non-whites is related to labour 
market entry and, to a lesser degree, occurs within this market. 
 
Graph 21 - Determinants of per capita expenditure inequality. Brazil. 2008/2009 
 





5. Factorial decomposition of Gini index in Brazil from 2003 to 2011 
 
The first sections of the present paper focused on the theme of income inequality 
building on a number of indicators and measures. In this topic, we analyse the 
contribution of the various sources for the decline in income inequality in Brazil 
between 2003 and 2011. 
Labour income, as one would expect, accounted for 73% of household income in Brazil 
in 2011, while public transfers – public retirement and pensions,6the Bolsa Família 
Program (PBF), and the Continuous Cash Benefit Program(BPC, from the Portuguese 
Benefício de Prestação Continuada) – accounted for 23.1%. The other sources – 
donations, rents, interest and dividends, private retirement and pension plans– were only 
3.9% of total household income (Table 15). In relation to 2003,there was a slight 
decrease in the slice of other sources of income, thus evidencing the effect of the 
expansion of the cash transfer programs starting in 2003 and the upholding of the policy 
targeting the strengthening of the minimum wage, started in the mid-1990s. 
 
Table 15 – Income share and concentration coefficient of components of per capita 
household income. Brazil. 2003 and 2011. 
Source of Income 
Income share (%)  Concentration coefficient 
2003 2011  2003 2011 
Labour 72.2 73.0  0.579 0.545 
Official pensions 22.3 22.4  0.581 0.517 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program (BPC) 0.1 0.3  -0.279 -0.207 
Bolsa Família Program (PBF) 0.1 0.4  -0.772 -0.796 
Others 5.3 3.9  0.644 0.561 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
Another piece of information in Table 16 refers to the concentration coefficient of each 
source of income in relation to total income.7 This coefficient can vary between -1 and 
1, with figures closer to1 indicating greater concentration of income in the wealthier 
portion of the population, whereas negative values represent the pro-poor (progressive) 
6 In this category are included, on the one hand, private sector retirement plans managed by Social 
Security (INSS), whose rules are set by the federal government and which are funded by contributions 
made by employees and employers, as well as non-contributory rural retirement plans; and on the 
other, the civil service’s statutory retirement plans. INSS retirement plans are progressive in nature, 
whereas those of the civil servants are notorious for their regressivity. 








C = , where i is the position of each 
household in the per capita household income distribution, yki is the income of household i from source 
k and ӯk is the average per capita income of source k. 
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nature of the source of income, that is, such income is appropriated mostly by the 
poorest portion of the population. In this sense, the progressivity of income derived 
from the federal government’s BPC and PBF cash transfer programs stands out, as does 
its good targeting, showing that these sources of income are mostly appropriated by the 
poorest portion of the population.Conversely, the concentration coefficient of the “other 
sources of income” is the highest of all household income components, an expected 
result since it comprises incomes from rents, interest, and dividends, which are usually 
associated with the wealthiest portion of the population. Nonetheless, we found a 
widespread drop in the concentration coefficient for nearly every source of income 
between 2003 and 2011, indicating that over this period the share of poorer households 
in most sources of income – at least not those derived from capital – increased in the 
country. 
Gini coefficient change was decomposed into1) the concentration effect, indicating a 
change in Gini stemming from changes in the levels of income concentration; and 2) the 
composition effect, which captures the effect of changes in a given source of income’s 
share in relation to total household income(Table 16). The third column adds these two 
effects to provide total effect of each source of income on Gini variation. 
 
Table 16 – Decomposition of change in the Gini coefficient of per capita household income. 
Brazil. 2003 and 2011. 






Labour 50.2 -0.1 50.1 
Official pensions 29.0 0.0 29.0 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program (BPC) -0.3 4.4 4.1 
Bolsa Família Program (PBF) 0.1 7.7 7.8 
Others 7.8 1.2 9.0 
Total 86.8 13.2 100.0 
 Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
The findings corroborate the progressive nature of the income inequality reduction from 
2003 to 2011, which was mostly prompted by changes in the concentration effect rather 
than by changes in the composition of household income – respectively 86.8% and 
13.2% of total effect. Moreover, we can clearly see an expansion in the cash transfer 
programs’ coverage, for both sources of income contributed for the drop in the Gini 
coefficient particularly due to these programs’ increased relative share in household 
income.PBF income contributed with 7.8% of the fall in Gini from 2003 through 2011, 
while the BPC accounted for 4.1% of this drop. The role of cash transfer programs in 
reducing income inequality is impressive if we consider their minor relative share in 
total household income: in 2011, income from these two social programs accounted for 
only 0.7% of total household income. 
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Labour income, in turn, was the most important factor accounting for the drop in Gini 
from 2003 to 2011, amounting to 50.1% of this fall, followed by public retirement and 
pensionplan income, which accounted for 29% of the reduced Gini coefficient. Still, the 
contribution of labour income for the reduction of Gini between 2003 and 2011 is 
relatively smaller than its share in household income. Such fact indicates that the labour 
market played an important role for the reduction of income inequality in Brazil, but 
that the role played by other sources of income cannot be neglected either. 
Another point worthy of mention is the evidence of a positive impact of the minimum-
wage recovery policy, affecting three sources of income: labour, public retirement and 
pensions and the BPC. In particular, these two last sources are affected foremost, since 
their values are indexed to the minimum wage in effect. Thus, real increase in minimum 
wage contributes to raise household income on three fronts, yet its effect impacted 
mostly the poorer households, which are more dependent on public transfers. 
 
5.1. Decomposition of Gini coefficient by region 
 
The findings for Brazil do not make it possible to show the remarkable differences 
between households located in the country’s various regions. The findings related to the 
participation of sources of income and concentration coefficients for households in 
Brazil’s five geographic regions render it possible to simplify the analysis into three 
groups, since findings for the North and Mid-West regions are similar, the same 
applyingto households in the South and Southeast regions, while the Northeast is 
analysed separately. 
Firstly, we notice that labour income has an impressive80.1% and 79.2% share in the 
income of households in, respectively, the North and Mid-West, in 2011 – the highest 
relative share of all five geographic regions (Table 17). This high labour income 
percentage to total household income reflects a relatively smaller income from public 
retirement and pensions, respectively, 14.3% e 16.6%, in the North and Mid-West; 
whereas this percentage for the remaining regions is always higher than 22%. These 
findings may also reflect a more accelerated growth of the labour market in these 
regions over the last years, especially in the Mid-West, plus being representative of 
demographically younger households in these regions, prompting a wide gap between 
the occupied and the retired. 
At the other end, we see that labour income has the lowest share in the income of 
families living in the Northeast region, 67.6% in 2011, just as the region’s households 
are heavily reliant on public retirement and pensions– 26.1%. The data show that labour 
income is proportionally more important in the composition of household income in 
areas with a better structured labour market. When the labour market is somewhat more 
restricted, households prove to be more dependent on public transfers, especially those 
in a situation of poverty. 
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It is also worth underscoring the growth of public transfer programs (PBF and BPC) 
forhousehold income, especially in the Northeast, 2.2% in 2011, while in the other 
regions this percentage varies between 0.3% (Southeast and South) and 1.2% (North). 
This composition by source of income must be considered in analysing how the 
Brazilian regions were differently impacted by the fall of inequality in the 2000s. 
 
Table 17 – Income share and concentration coefficient of components of per capita 
household income, by geographic region. Brazil. 2003 and 2011. 
Region Source of Income 
Income share   Concentration coefficient 
2003 2011   2003 2011 
North 
Labour 80.6 80.1   0.550 0.556 
Official pensions 14.4 14.3  0.570 0.521 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program 0.2 0.5  -0.029 -0.013 
Bolsa Família Program 0.2 0.7  -0.656 -0.682 
Others 4.7 4.4  0.567 0.478 
Northeast 
Labour 68.2 67.6   0.588 0.569 
Official pensions 26.5 26.1  0.609 0.553 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program 0.1 0.7  0.068 0.178 
Bolsa Família Program 0.5 1.5  -0.561 -0.610 
Others 4.7 4.1  0.586 0.544 
Southeast 
Labour 71.6 73.0   0.554 0.517 
Official pensions 23.1 22.8  0.567 0.508 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program 0.0 0.2  -0.448 -0.372 
Bolsa Família Program 0.0 0.1  -0.860 -0.868 
Others 5.3 3.8  0.643 0.573 
South 
Labour 72.2 72.8   0.529 0.483 
Official pensions 21.9 22.7  0.528 0.438 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program 0.1 0.2  -0.412 -0.422 
Bolsa Família Program 0.1 0.1  -0.858 -0.891 
Others 5.8 4.1  0.630 0.555 
Mid-West 
Labour 80.5 79.2   0.581 0.542 
Official pensions 14.4 16.6  0.580 0.561 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program 0.0 0.4  -0.528 -0.295 
Bolsa Família Program 0.1 0.2  -0.769 -0.842 
Others 4.9 3.7  0.600 0.514 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
The results presented inTable 18show the relative contribution of each source of income 
for reducing income inequality between 2003 and 2011. We can see that labour income 
accounted for the biggest drop in household income inequality in the Southeast, South 
and Mid-West regions, not surprisingly the richest regions in the country in terms of per 
capita income. This corroborates the importance of a structured and dynamic labour 





Table 18 – Decomposition of the change in the Gini coefficient of per capita household 
income, by geographic region. Brazil. 2003 and 2011. 






Labour -30.8 0.4 -30.5 
Official pensions 46.5 0.0 46.5 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program -0.4 14.4 14.1 
Bolsa Família Program 0.8 43.0 43.8 
Others 26.5 -0.4 26.1 
Total 42.6 57.4 100.0 
Northeast 
Labour 30.0 0.2 30.2 
Official pensions 33.3 0.1 33.4 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program -1.0 5.8 4.8 
Bolsa Família Program 1.1 26.2 27.3 
Others 4.3 0.0 4.3 
Total 67.7 32.3 100.0 
Southeast 
Labour 55.9 0.0 56.0 
Official pensions 28.5 0.0 28.5 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program -0.2 3.6 3.4 
Bolsa Família Program 0.0 3.3 3.3 
Others 6.7 2.2 8.8 
Total 90.9 9.1 100.0 
South 
Labour 54.2 0.0 54.2 
Official pensions 32.5 0.3 32.8 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program 0.0 2.4 2.4 
Bolsa Família Program 0.1 2.0 2.0 
Others 6.1 2.5 8.6 
Total 92.9 7.1 100.0 
Mid-West 
Labour 74.0 0.1 74.0 
Official pensions 6.8 -0.6 6.2 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program -1.0 8.0 7.0 
Bolsa Família Program 0.3 3.6 3.8 
Others 8.9 -0.1 8.9 
Total 89.0 11.0 100.0 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
At the other extreme, we see the regressive result of labour income for household 
income distribution in the Northern region, indicating that labour market growth in that 
region was highly unfavourable for the poorest. Two aspects must be considered at this 
point. The first one refers to the impressive increase of the public sector in the region, 
whose average wages tend to be higher than those of the other forms of occupation. 
Concurrently, in this region an impressive percentage tends to earn incomes below the 
minimum wage because the labour market structure prompts a high level of informality. 
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Cash transfer programs have contributed toward the fall of income inequality, mostly in 
the poorest regions of Brazil, the North and Northeast, despite their relative smaller 
share in total household income. 
 
5.2. Extending the spatial analysis: decomposition of Gini coefficient by region and 
area 
 
More striking than the regional differences are the differences within each region’s 
various spaces. The Northeast, for instance, groups metropolitan regions boasting 
industrial activities and modern services;rapidly expanding non-metropolitan urban 
areas with regional production centres; and highly differentiated rural areas, some 
transformed by the recent commodities boom while others are still lagging in 
subsistence economy. 
Thus, we have opted to broaden the scope of the analysis by breaking the regions down 
by urban and rural areas. Yet, for the sake of simplification, we have limited the 
analysis to two regions only: the Northeast and the Southeast. The reason for such 
choice is hinged on the fact that both regions are representative of different economic 
and social dynamics, besides exhibiting distinct levels of poverty and income inequality.  
Initially, we see that the household income structure presents similar compositions 
regardless of place, with labour income and public retirement and pension income 
together accounting for over 90% of household income in Brazil (Table19). 
Yet, some differences can also be seen. Labour income share is higher in urban areas, 
this percentage having increased between 2003 and 2011, while the opposite took place 
in rural area households. This change in composition reflects the increased importance 
of public transfer income to rural households, especially in the Northeast, which rose 
from 40.2% of household income in 2003 to 48.1% in 2011, higher than that of labour 
income. 
As the families in these places also tend to be poorer, once again we see increased 
dependence on the government’s cash transfer programs by the most vulnerable 
households. These findingsfurther strengthen the notion that labour income tends to be 
proportionally less important in composing household income in places with a less 
structured labour market. 
The concentration coefficients by area fail to show any significant differences and tend 
to exhibit the same pattern as found in the geographic region subset. However, it is 
worth stressing the high concentration coefficient of public retirement and pensions for 
Northeast’s rural households, while labour income is lower if compared with rural 
households in the Southeast. This is due to the fact that the labour market’s lesser 
dynamism and scope in rural Northeast –where precarious working conditions, mostly 
for self-employed workers, still abound – causes part of these retirements to be 
channelled to population segments that are not considered poor by the region’s own 
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standards. On the contrary, the poor households of the rural Southeast who receive these 
retirements tend to have a level of income that is higher than that of some non-poor 
rural Northeast segments.  
 
Table 19 – Income share and concentration coefficient of per capita household income 
components by area. Brazil. 2003 and 2011. 
Region Area Source of Income 
Income share   Concentration coefficient 
2003 2011   2003 2011 
Northeast 
Urban 
Labour 69.9 70.7  0.589 0.559 
Official pensions 24.6 23.5  0.608 0.555 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program 0.1 0.6  -0.047 0.079 
Bolsa Família Program 0.3 1.0  -0.616 -0.654 
Others 5.1 4.2   0.569 0.528 
Rural 
Labour 57.5 48.0  0.396 0.411 
Official pensions 38.3 42.4  0.633 0.609 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program 0.2 1.3  0.377 0.477 
Bolsa Família Program 1.7 4.4  -0.388 -0.453 
Others 2.3 4.0   0.328 0.515 
Southeast 
Urban 
Labour 71.5 73.3  0.549 0.515 
Official pensions 23.0 22.6  0.564 0.508 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program 0.0 0.2  -0.463 -0.399 
Bolsa Família Program 0.0 0.1  -0.871 -0.874 
Others 5.4 3.8   0.633 0.566 
Rural 
Labour 71.9 65.9  0.495 0.433 
Official pensions 24.0 27.9  0.548 0.482 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program 0.1 0.8  -0.359 -0.001 
Bolsa Família Program 0.3 0.8  -0.699 -0.741 
Others 3.7 4.6   0.662 0.664 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
Moreover, we have noticed that the lesser progressivity of PBF income in the North-
eastern region as compared with all other regions is a consequence of a relatively higher 
household concentration coefficient in these areas.Taken as a whole, these findings 
show that households in rural Northeast are faced with restrained labour market 
conditions and are highly dependent on public transfer income, regardless of their being 
among the region’s poorest areas or not. As emphasized in the paragraph, the higher 
concentration coefficient of these sources of income in the poorer areas does not mean 
these public policies are flawed, but rather a specific shaping of their labour markets 
and land-ownership structure.  
Lastly, Table20decomposes Gini changes by sources of income in rural and urban 
Northeast and Southeast areas. Once again, we notice the impressive contribution of 
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labour income for the income gap reduction in Brazil between 2003 and 2011 – except 
in rural Northeast. 
 
Table 20 – Decomposition of change in the Gini coefficient of per capita household income, 
by area. Brazil. 2003 and 2011. 







Labour 44.3 -0.2 44.2 
Official pensions 27.4 0.4 27.8 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program -0.9 6.0 5.0 
Bolsa Família Program 0.5 18.7 19.3 
Others 4.1 -0.3 3.7 
Total 75.4 24.6 100.0 
Rural 
Labour -83.7 -62.2 -145.9 
Official pensions 97.2 -64.7 32.5 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program -7.8 4.4 -3.4 
Bolsa Família Program 20.6 249.7 270.3 
Others -61.3 7.8 -53.4 
Total -34.9 134.9 100.0 
Southeast 
Urban 
Labour 55.8 0.1 55.9 
Official pensions 28.5 0.0 28.5 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program -0.2 3.5 3.3 
Bolsa Família Program 0.0 3.1 3.1 
Others 6.9 2.3 9.2 
Total 91.0 9.0 100.0 
Rural 
Labour 65.8 -1.2 64.5 
Official pensions 26.3 -2.2 24.1 
Continuous Cash Benefit Program -2.4 6.9 4.5 
Bolsa Família Program 0.3 9.4 9.7 
Others -0.1 -2.7 -2.8 
Total 89.9 10.1 100.0 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
It is worth pointing out that household labour income in rural areas of the Southeast 
region has a greater relative contribution for the drop in the Gini coefficient than in that 
region’s urban areas, respectively, 64.5% and 55.9%. That is, even as cash transfer 
programs rise in importance, contributing for 14.2% of the drop, the labour market had 
a fundamental role for reducing inequality in the rural Southeast. The same cannot be 
said of rural Northeast.  
Dependence on social programs in rural areas of the Northeast is of such magnitude that 
the contribution of PBF income for the drop in Gini is higher than 100%. This finding 
can be accounted for by the fact that labour income and other sources of income moved 
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in the opposite direction, that is, these findings show that there was a significant 
worsening in the appropriation of these sources of income among the poorest 
households. This statement can be read in a different way: in places where the labour 
market, especially in metropolitan regions and concentrated in basic sectors, expanded 
in the Northeast, it managed to reduce poverty.  
Therefore, these results contradict the arguments that, by the “fault” of programs like 
the PBF,the program’s beneficiaries left the labour market to live only of public 
transfers. This is so because the negative contribution of labour income for the 
reduction in the Gini coefficient is limited in scope in some areas and regions. The 
importance of cash transfer programs in the reduction of inequality is concentrated 
precisely in areas where the labour market is constrained, as is the flow of income. In 
the Northeast’s urban areas, for example, inequality fell primarily on account of labour 
income (44.2%), retirements (27.8%) and,only then, cash transfer programs (24.3%). 
The results presented in this section underscore the importance of the labour market as 
the main tool for reducing the income gap in Brazil during the 2000s, even if with 
striking spatial differences –just as cash transfer programs are undeniably critical for 
this reduction, especially among the most vulnerable households of the poorest regions.  
Nonetheless, we cannot overlook the fact that this period was marked by high economic 
growth, which drove a sharp expansion of the labour market, formal jobs mostly, and of 
wages. As for the potential of cash transfer programs to reduce the income gap, this 
tends to disappear over time as the number of beneficiary households increases. It is 
worth stressing that fighting against inequality is not the purpose of these programs, but 
just a positive externality.  
In short, the end of the economy’s expansion cycle, from 2012 onwards, may 
compromise those factors that enabled reducing inequality. First, by affecting job 
supply and the evolution of real wage. And second, by limiting, through fiscal 
constraints, the possibility of increasing transfers to the beneficiary population that is 
already close to that population situated below the poverty level by the criteria adopted 





6. Relationship between income and consumption-expenditure inequality 
 
Generally, studies of inequality in Brazil analyse the phenomenon from the perspective 
of household income, mostly because of the monetisation of the economy and the wide 
array of surveys capturing such information. Yet, it is possible to analyse this point 
from the perspective of a household’s current expenditure through the Household 
Budget Survey (POF, from the Portuguese Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares) 
Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares (POF), a survey conducted by Brazil’s national 
statistics office IBGE every five years and is focused on the consumption habits of the 
Brazilian population. As the POF also captures information regarding household 
income, this makes it possible to compare the relative distribution of these variables by 
parametric estimation of regions or places for which there is no data on monetary 
income or monetary income is very low. 
Two aspects point to the relevance of estimating inequality indicators building on 
household expenditure. The first one refers to a vision of inequality that best fits 
societies with a high percentage of self-employed individuals in rural activities and 
where the separation between income and earnings is often impracticable. Therefore, 
expenditure data would provide a much more adequate indicator of the household’s 
capacity to pay (Castellanos, 2007).  
The second aspect is related to greater comparability, since there is no general rule as to 
which perspective should be adopted to estimate inequality across the countries of the 
globe, especially the poorest. Therefore, the existence of data in Brazil that makes it 
possible to estimate indicators from these two perspectives broadens potential 
comparability with other countries.  
These two reasons have coalesced in this project as it seeks to conduct a comparative 
analysis with India, whose inequality indicators are calculated on the basis of 
expenditure, since income is only measured for wage earners, whose share in Indian 
society, albeit rising, is still limited. 
It must be stressed, however, that the purpose of this section is not to conduct a 
thorough analysis of inequality by household expenditure, but just to observe the key 
differences between the estimates of some inequality indicators building on the two 
approaches. Moreover, relying on the detailed wealth of data afforded by the POF, we 
use two concepts of expenditure, one that refers to the average monthly per capita 
household total expenditure in Brazil; and the other, which considers monthly 
expenditure minus expenses related to direct taxes and labour charges in order to 
observe household expenditure in non-compulsory services. 
For that, we have considered only the latest survey, the 2008/2009 POF, since the 
previous ones were not nationwide in scope, with the month of January 2009 as the 
reference. The period was marked by macroeconomic uncertainties, respectively, the 
uncertainty in the early days of the Lula administration and that triggered by the global 
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financial crisis, even though the first period is characterized by a fall in average income 
in a context of high interest rates and currency depreciation, unlike the second. 
Graph 22 presents the monthly average evolution for both per capita household income 
and expenditure.8 In the first place, we notice that household income is higher than 
expenditure. At the same time, the gap between the two periods widens, in that the 
average household income was 15.8% higher than average expenditure, and the gap is 
26.4% higher if we consider the expenditure without taxes. This result was expected if 
we consider the flatter slope of the Engel curve for higher income levels,9 thus 
indicating that expenditure does not grow at the same pace as income.  
 
Graph 22 – Monthly average of per capita household income and expenditure.Brazil 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on POF/IBGE microdata. 
 
Next, we seek to assess the potential differences across the two inequality criteria. 
Graph 23 show that expenditure inequality, especially without taxes, is always lower 
than the income indicator. This finding is consistent with international studies (Krueger, 
Perri, 2006; Jappelli, Pistaferri, 2009), even though the difference between these two 
indicators in Brazil is smaller than that of other countries. In Central Europe, for 
example, the income Gini index is 31% higher than that for expenditure; in 
Scandinavian countries the difference is 37.5%, while it is 14.6% higher in Southern 
European countries (Bonsang, Perelman, Bosch, 2005). This pattern is expected since 
poorer households tend to allocate a higher portion of household income to expenditure, 
whereas wealthier households can save part of their income; therefore, the dispersion of 
household expenditure tends to be lower than that of income. 
8 It is imperative to note that income as measured by POF is more detailed and comprehensive than the 
income obtained through other IBGE household surveys, like the PNAD, particularly nonmonetary 
income and that yielded by asset variation, comprising rents from property selling, inheritances, 
financial investments, among others. 
9 The Engel curve is a graphic representation of the relation between household income and 
expenditure for a given good or service. 
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Graph 23 – Gini coefficient and Theil index of per capita household income and 
expenditure. Brazil. 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on POF/IBGE microdata. 
 
Concurrently, the lower expenditure without taxes inequality rate shows the progressive 
nature of direct taxes and labour charges. It is worth recalling that both Gini and Theil 
are limited when it comes to capturing this information.10 Alternatively, we opted to 
present in Graph 24 the relative proportion of total household income and expenditure 
as earned by population percentiles, in our case, the richest 10%, the intermediate 40% 
and the poorest 50%. The results show that the share appropriate for the richest is higher 
for income than for expenditures. 
These findings show that a sharper drop in income inequality indicators relative to 
expenditure indicators is related to the poor households’ smaller share in total income as 
compared with their share in total expenditure. Thus, the relative increase of the poorer 
households’ appropriation of income is more significant than that of expenditure, while 
the wealthiest households’ drop in their relative share of appropriation is significant 
only for total income. This is so because expenditure is less subject to compression by 
the wealthiest or to increase by the poorest due to the composition of expenditure itself. 
The wealthy tend to commit a higher percentage of their spending to increase their 
assets, while the poor do so to reduce liabilities (payment of debts incurred in the 
past).Lastly, Brazil’s direct taxation progressivity can be assessed in the relative 
distribution of expenditure without taxes.  
The estimates presented in this section are evidence of the existence of key differences 
in analysing inequality from the income or expenditure perspectives. These differences 
10 We stress that the present analysis only considers direct taxes, while total tax burden in Brazil is 
regressive. Among others, Payeras (2010) noted that tax regressivity in Brazil stems from two main 
factors: although progressive, direct taxation has a low share in income, while indirect taxes are 
regressive and their share in income is nearly two times higher than direct taxation. The second factor 
refers to the far-from-ideal selection of goods for the purpose of taxing household consumption, which 
harms poor households more than wealthy ones. 
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are basically reflected in the magnitude of the indicators, yet aggregate evolution over 
time tends to follow the same pattern. 
 
Graph 24 – Share of income and expenditure by percentile of population. Brazil 
 





7. Functional distribution of income 
In the previous sections, we focused only on the distribution of personal income by 
building primarily on labour income. Even though the Brazilian data on inequality is 
still situated at very high levels, they are underestimated, as capital income inequality is 
always higher than labour income inequality (Piketty, 2014).However, the fiscal 
structure, the government’s revenues and the firm’s earnings are absolutely different in 
Brazil from developed countries, which is why it is not possible to directly apply the 
methodology proposed by Piketty (2014). In Brazil, government revenues are primarily 
provided by indirect taxation, expenditure is strongly biasedby public debt payments 
and the firms’ operating earnings are often exceeded by their financial earnings. 
However and for the sake of illustration, we present a rough evolution of the functional 
distribution of income in Brazil, drawing from national statistics office IBGE data in its 
System of Annual National Accounts, which since 1990has been providing 
disaggregated data on gross domestic income including “compensation of employees”,11 
“gross operating surplus”, “mixed self-employment income”, and “taxes levied on 
production and imports”.12 
According to this data, compensation of employees had the greatest share in GDP 
between 1990 and 2009, followed by gross operating surplus, both ending the period 
with almost the same figures with which they started in the 1990s, 45% and 33% of 
GDP, respectively (Table21). However, over this period these shares fluctuated sharply 
in the 1990s, compensation of employees dropped from 45% to 41% of GDP, while 
gross operating surplus rose slightly, from 33% to 34% of GDP over the same period.It 
is worth noting that the evolution of compensation of employees as a ratio of GDP tends 
to be counter-cyclical13and constant in the long term,in accordance with the theoretical 
argument advanced by Kalecky (1971), as can be seen in Table21. 
Moreover, self-employment income rose and net taxes stabilized. In the first half of the 
2000s, these trends continued, with compensation of employees nearing 39% of GDP in 
2004, while gross operating surplus closed that same year at36%, while net taxes and 
self-employed workers’ income remain more or less stable.  
From 2004 onwards, these trends are reversed, with compensation of employees 
rebounding to 44% in 2009, and gross operating surplus falling back to 33% of 
11 The IBGE “compensation of employees” series is made up of “wages”, “actual social contributions”, 
and “imputed social contributions”. The “actual social contributions” are payments made by the 
employer on behalf of the employees to official social security institutes and private retirement plans, 
which are necessary to ensure access to benefits. The “imputed social contributions” are payments 
made by the employer to employees, former employees or their dependents to ensure benefits other 
than social security. 
12 Before 1990, this division only existed for census years (1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985). 
13 During a recession, companies lay off fewer skilled workers, which increases the average wage paid, 
and hire workers on the basis of floor wages, which reduces the average wage. 
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GDP.14Simultaneously there was a drop in the self-employment share of 
GDP(Table21).The compensation of employees share follows a counter-cyclical trend 
and only in 2009, the year of the economic crisis that was triggered by the international 
financial debacle, reaches 1993 levels. In the long term,compensation of employees is at 
40-41% of total GDP. 
Table 21 – Functional distribution of income, % GDP (1990-2009) 




income (SEI) Net taxes 
1990 45 33 7 16 
1991 42 38 7 14 
1992 44 38 6 14 
1993 45 35 6 14 
1994 40 38 6 16 
1995 43 31 13 14 
1996 43 32 12 13 
1997 41 34 12 13 
1998 42 34 12 13 
1999 41 34 11 14 
2000 40 34 11 15 
2001 41 34 11 15 
2002 40 34 11 15 
2003 40 35 11 15 
2004 39 36 10 16 
2005 40 35 9 16 
2006 41 35 9 15 
2007 41 34 9 15 
2008 42 33 9 16 
2009 44 33 8 15 
Source: System of National Accounts/IBGE 
It is worth stressing that the series “compensation of employees” and “gross operating 
surplus” as calculated by the National Accounts have some problems as measures per 
se, respectively, of the share of labour and capital in national income (Bastos, 2012). 
One of the problems refers to “self-employment earnings”. In general, self-employment 
income is typically treated as income from capital. However, its composition also 
presupposes a portion derived from labour income. In practice the self-employed group 
comprises liberals, capitalists and sole traders who created their own employment, 
although most of the income is appropriated by typically capitalist entrepreneurs. This is 
reflected in the fluctuations of this portion of income, which follows the same pattern as 
the gross surplus.  
This exercise is of a preliminary nature and calls for improvement based on other 
theme-related studies conducted in the country. Its main limitations refer to the wide 
diversity of types of income in the sphere of “income from capital” and to the fact the 
role of source-deducted taxes for each one of the sources of income is not computed. 
14 There is a change in the methodology used by the IBGE: the 1990 to 1994 data are based on the 1985 




                                                          
Moreover, a more accurate understanding of the evolution trends of the functional 
distribution of income would require analysis by segments of activities and regions, 
which is not in the scope of the present paper. The trends shown above, in turn, deserve 
a more in-depth comparison with the macroeconomic benchmarks of the period. 
8. Main Shifts in the Occupational and Class Structures  
 
This section is organized in the following way. In a first moment,we briefly highlight 
the main changes and permanences in the productive structure based on economic 
activity sectors with the aim of providing a background to the behaviour of labour 
demand. Next, we highlight aspects related to changes observed in the composition of 
the occupational groups, plus underscoring inequalities related to incomes within and 
between occupations. In the last subsection, we present the recent evolution of the 
Brazilian class structure based on PNAD data.  
While the 1990s were marked by unemployment and informality, in a setting of 
increasingly more flexible labour relations and downsizing of middle management, in 
the 2000s the labour market followed some of the trends started in the 1990s, like 
diversification of the retail and services industries and increased subcontracting, plus 
temporary jobs.Still, unlike the previous decade, the country experienced a growth 
cycle, with sharp drops in unemployment, informality and poverty rates, especially after 
the mid-2000s. Additionally, a huge contingent of workers was incorporated by the 
labour market’s formal sector.  
Against this backdrop, debate has centred on whether a “new middle class” had 
emerged (Neri, 2011) or, alternatively, whether the base of the social pyramid had 
widened with the inclusion of a new working class profile (Pochmann, 2012; Souza, 
2012). Nonetheless, this inclusion has taken place in a context of wide working contract 
flexibility and occupational instability, such that whatbegan to be addressed in the 
1980s by the advanced capitalist countries as a loss of rights triggered bythe so-called 
“crisis of the Welfare State”,here has been seen as the gateway to the formal and 
consumption marketthat was opened to some millions of workers. 
We have opted to prioritize an analysis of occupations, which means adopting them as 
the analytical unit that structures social positions. This way, we can account for features 
related, first, to the hierarchization of positions and, second, to social differentiation 
across occupations and individuals. 
 
8.1. Shifts in the sectoral structure 
 
We have sought to observe shifts in the productive structure in terms of the sectoral 
composition of the stock of jobs by economic activity. We used the fourth revised 
edition of the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities 
57 
 
(ISIC),as published by the ILO in 2008.15The findings show, first, a dizzying fall of the 
share of the “extractive activities” sector, mirroring to a large extent the agricultural 
sector’s mechanization and modernisation process.From another perspective, we can 
also observe that such drop was offset by a growth in almost all the other sectors, in 
particular those linked to the services economy and to construction. The manufacturing 
industry, despite a slight growth between 2001 and 2005, virtually stagnated in terms of 
its share in the stock of employed personnel over the period.In other words, at least 
from the point of view of employment, we cannot speak of 
deindustrialization(Graph25). 
 
Graph25 – Relative share of economic activity sectors to total employment. Brazil. 
 1995-2011 
 
Source:1995, 2001, 2005 and 2011 PNADs. 
 
15 For the purpose of this paper, we will use the twelve ISIC categories, in accordance with one ofILO’s 
suggested aggregation standards, as follows: (1) extractive activities; (2) manufacturing; (3) public 
utilities; (4) construction; (5) wholesale and retail trade; (6) hotels and restaurants; (7) transports and 
communication; (8) real estate and financial services; (9) public administration; (10) social services; (11) 
private household services and (12) other services.We applied this typology to IBGE’s National 
Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE, from the Portuguese Classificação Nacional de Atividade 





                                                          
In spite of a relatively low variation in the percentage stock of total individuals 
employed, the sectors that generated the most jobs had varying behaviours over the 
period. We can see the percentage contribution of each of them for total job creation. It 
is remarkable that, between 1995 and 2011, the “Wholesale and retail trade” sector was 
the country’s job generation main driver: slightly over 1/5 (21.7%) of the new jobs were 
generated by this economic sector(Graph26). 
Ranking second, we can see that the “Social Services” sector also played a key role, 
growing in relative homogeneous fashion in each of the periods and accounting for the 
creation of nearly 18.0% of total jobs from 1995 to 2011. In third and fourth, it is 
interesting to note that two completely different sectors in terms of their internal 
dynamics (“Construction” and “Real Estate and Financial Services”) played a similar 
role in these years, contributing with about 15.0% of the new jobs. The “manufacturing” 
sector, in turn and despite not having had any participation in the job generation process 
between 2005 and 2011, closed the period with a percentage of 13.1%, largely due to its 
importance in the 2001/2005 five-year period. 
 
Graph26 – Relative share of economic sectors in total employment generated in periods. 
Brazil. 1995- 2011 
 




The next tableallows deepening this analysis and presents a summary of wage 
inequality between and within economic activity sectors. For each of them we have the 
average income, the relative income and the Coefficient of Variation.16 
Overall, we may say that there was a converging trend, with a reduction in cross-sector 
income inequality. The upward outliers in the first year (“Public Utilities”, “Real Estate 
and Financial Services” and “Transport and Communication”) were the ones that 
declined most in relation to global relative incomebetween 1995 and 2011, decreasing 
by, respectively, 45.5%, 24.1% and 26.6%, respectively(Table22). 
Conversely and in what can be identified as an outcome of the minimum wage 
appreciation policy carried out by the government that started in the mid-2000s, the two 
sectors with the lowest earnings had a considerable growth in their average income. 
Average wages in “extractive activities” rose from R$651 to R$887, ora 36.0% real 
increase; similarly,the “private household services” sector also rose (a 40.7% increase), 
withthe worker’s average income rising from R$382 to R$538, still between 1995 and 
2011. 
 
Table22 – Mean Wages, relative % to mean occupied population wages and coefficient of 
wage variation – ISIC classes – Brazil – 1995, 2001, 2005, 2011.  
$ Average $ Relative CV $ Average $ Relative CV $ Average $ Relative CV $ Average $ Relative CV
Extractive activities 651,24 0,52 2,42 615,08 0,53 2,40 659,91 0,60 2,83 887,12 0,64 2,33
Manufacturing 1496,51 1,19 1,54 1276,77 1,09 1,71 1122,20 1,02 2,13 1351,18 0,98 1,38
Public Utilities 2706,31 2,15 1,01 2078,82 1,78 1,08 2142,64 1,95 1,14 2332,87 1,69 1,00
Construction 1137,18 0,90 1,41 904,76 0,77 1,41 902,94 0,82 1,63 1181,60 0,86 1,30
Wholesale and retail trade 1381,37 1,10 1,71 1197,46 1,02 1,94 1090,91 0,99 1,53 1277,22 0,93 1,46
Hotels and restaurants 1146,13 0,91 1,60 958,78 0,82 1,72 870,74 0,79 1,74 1042,07 0,76 1,38
Transportation and communications 1722,05 1,37 1,32 1492,07 1,27 1,28 1341,10 1,22 1,17 1551,18 1,13 1,21
Real estate and financial services 2394,22 1,90 1,42 2066,29 1,76 1,51 1945,54 1,77 1,55 2252,33 1,64 1,95
Public Administration 1900,44 1,51 1,42 2016,11 1,72 1,31 1853,24 1,69 1,29 2349,72 1,71 1,26
Social services 1528,79 1,21 1,71 1553,37 1,33 1,43 1402,33 1,28 1,42 1721,76 1,25 1,26
Private household services 382,82 0,30 0,83 399,63 0,34 0,78 388,04 0,35 0,62 538,79 0,39 0,61
Mean 1259,00 1,00 1,74 1171,00 1,00 1,75 1097,00 1,00 1,79 1377,00 1,00 1,64
(ISIC)
1995 2001 2005 2011
Source: PNAD. Monetary values ​​deflated to the year 2012, excluding workers with incomes equal to zero.
 
The inequality reduction trend throughout the whole period can also be seen by 
analysing each sector internally. But it is worth stressing that there were moments in 
which these inequalities expanded and shrank. Over the two first periods (1995-2001 
and 2001-2005), both presented some degree of increased wage dispersion. In contrast, 
in the years from 2005 to 2011, only the “Real Estate” and “Transport and 
Communication” sectors continued to experience increased inequality, whereas in all 
other sectors the coefficient fell. This data becomes especially clear if we observe that 
the coefficient of variation overall average, which had risen from 1.74 to 1.79 from 
1995 to 2005, falls sharply in 2011, reaching 1.64, or 6% below the first year in the 
series(Table 22). 
16 The Coefficient of variation is a measure of dispersion that enables comparability across different 
distributions, and is calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean (σ/μ). 
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The behaviour of inequality in each of these sectors is due to variations related to the 
returns to education (Graph27). Two prevailing trends can be identified. First, one that 
refers to the returns to middle education in practically every sector over the entire 
period. And a second one, specific to returns to higher education, which grows till 2005 
just to decline over the following years. This has been a main feature of the Brazilian 
labour market since the mid-2000s, and is largely due to a widening of the supply’s 
overall schooling levels boosted by the expansion of the educational systems over the 
last decades, in synch with the demographic transition process that has replaced older 
cohorts with younger ones with higher educational levels. However, a drop in the wage 
bonus for higher educational levels seems to suggest that demand for labour has not 
achieved a higher complexity, that is, it did not move towards better quality occupations 
at the same pace so as to pay a better schooled labour force, with middle and higher 
education, accordingly. 
The fall in returns to higher education does not occur in those sectors where the 
coefficient of variation did not fall (“Real Estate” and “Transport and 
Communication”). These are, precisely, capital- and technology-intensive sectors 
characterized by a sort of internal polarisation:on one side, a reduced spectrum of 
extremely well-paid occupations with highly valued graduation diplomas, and on the 
other a broad contingent of workers in basic occupations. 
Hence, a description of the sectoral evolution is not sufficient for understanding 
inequality in the distribution of occupational positions carrying greater or lesser prestige 
and qualification. In order to better understand the distribution of the various 
occupations according to social valuing and recognition, it is necessary to resort to a 
typology that, cutting across economic activity sectors, will make it possible for us to 
identify jobs and occupations from the point of view of their quality and prestige. 





Graph27 – Relative income by levels of education within economic sectors. Brazil. 1995-2011 
 
Source:1995, 2001, 2005 and 2011 PNADs. 
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8.2. Shifts in the occupational structure 
 
For the analysis in this section, we also resort to an international occupational 
classification standard, the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), 
in the version published by the ILO in 1988.17By analysing the productive structure 
from this angle, we can demonstrate that shifts in the sectoral composition of the 
productive structure are associated with changes in types of occupation, with the various 
ways in which authority is exercised, and with dynamics that are internal to the firms 
and organizations, configuring various forms of inequality.  
The findings indicate a sharp reduction in “Elementary Occupations”, followed by a 
growth that is fairly distributed across the other occupational groups, with the exception 
of agricultural workers(Graphs 28and 29). Briefly, the data suggest clear improvement 
of the occupational structure as a whole, with individuals occupying better quality and 
better paid jobs. In this respect, it is worth noting that occupationalgroups 
“Professionals”, “Technicians”, and “Servicesand Sales Workers” grew most, mirroring 
transformations both micro-organizational and in the productive structure, evidencing 
an occupational configuration that is heavily structured on an increasingly more 
diversified services sector. 
17 This is a classification system for comparing international occupational structures. We use an 
aggregation of this system in nine categories: (1) legislators, senior officials and managers; (2) 
professionals; (3) technicians and associate professionals; (4) office clerks; (5) service workers and shop 
and market sales workers; (6) skilled agricultural and fishery workers; (7) craft and related trades 
workers; (8) plant and machine operators and assemblers; and; (9) elementary occupations. In order to 
make it easier to understand these broad occupational groups, in the Annex we provide a list of the 




                                                          
Graph28 – Occupational structure; Brazil, 1995-2011 
 
Source:1995, 2001, 2005 and 2011 PNADs. 
 
From the point of view of the dynamic of the group’s change and percentage growth, 
however, important variations can be observed over these periods, and again the years 
from 2005 to 2011 distinguish themselves from the others. Between 1995 and 2005, 
changes were stronger as a result of the growth of “Professionals”, “Technicians” and to 
a lesser extent, “Managers”. As for the more recent period (2005 to 2011) andas 
mentioned earlier, “Service Workers” had the highest growth (40.0%).  
The period’s overall trend, however, was of sharp growth of “Professionals” and 
“Technicians”, who more than doubled in size (120.0% growth), while all the other 
groups grew by about 60.0%. 
Still, this high percentage growth was concentrated in groups with small relative 
participation. For example, typical middle-class salaried segments – “Managers”, 
Professionals” and “Technicians” – increased their share from 16% to 24% over the 
period. But in terms of relative share, the increase in workers with some qualification– 
“Clerical Support Workers”, “Services and Sales workers”, “Craft Workers”, “Skilled 
Agricultural Workers” and “Plant and Machine Operators” expanded from 47% to 
52.3%. These segments probably absorbed good part of the labour market’s new 
entrants and those already working in elementary occupations who, notwithstanding a 






Graph29 – Percentage growth of occupational groups. Brazil, 1995-2011. 
 
Source:1995, 2001, 2005 and 2011 PNADs. 
 
These changes affected inequality between and within occupational groups in distinct 
ways. Broadly, the trend toward convergence remained and gaps between strata 
narrowed: the three groups with the lowest average income, “Elementary Occupations” 
“Agricultural workers”, and “Craft workers”, were the only ones to see their relative 
income grow over the period, whereas, for all the others, relative income declined. 
Concerning internal inequalities, it is not possible to spot a dominant pattern. At the top 
of the hierarchy, wage dispersion grew considerably only among “Managers” and 
“Technicians”, precisely where returns to higher education increased over the period; 
yet, the same did not happen in their intermediate group, “Professionals”. On the other 
hand, we can see a sharp reduction in the dispersion of the group that grew the most 
between 2005 and 2011 (“Service and Sales workers”), but also the one that lost most 
space over these 16 years (“Elementary Occupations”). In this last case, we may argue 
that the minimum wage may have contributed for the smaller gap across poorly-
qualified workers, working as the social stratification’s, as well as the labour market’s, 




Table23 – Mean Wages, relative % to mean occupied population wages and coefficient of 
wage variation – ISCO 1 digit classes – Brazil – 1995, 2001, 2005, 2011.  
$ Average $ Relative CV $ Average $ Relative CV $ Average $ Relative CV $ Average $ Relative CV
Managers 3911,87 3,11 1,24 3445,08 2,94 1,40 2599,93 2,36 1,76 2962,94 2,14 1,60
Profesionals 2749,12 2,18 1,38 2725,79 2,33 1,30 2391,78 2,17 1,31 2875,74 2,07 1,36
Technicians and associate professionals 2220,65 1,76 1,21 1930,27 1,65 1,18 1729,61 1,57 1,11 2022,70 1,46 1,40
Clerical support workers 1324,34 1,05 1,02 1145,39 ,98 0,94 976,05 ,88 0,93 1176,58 ,85 0,96
Service and sales workers 1033,01 ,82 1,35 931,50 ,79 1,41 716,25 ,65 0,99 925,27 ,67 0,93
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 574,49 ,46 2,46 512,59 ,44 1,85 510,42 ,46 1,71 710,22 ,51 2,29
Craft and related trades workers 974,67 ,77 0,99 829,29 ,71 0,93 811,08 ,74 0,88 1106,82 ,80 0,92
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers 1212,42 ,96 0,95 1075,18 ,92 0,88 989,18 ,90 0,94 1240,99 ,89 0,87
Elementary occupations 530,29 ,42 1,43 507,82 ,43 1,10 477,16 ,43 0,77 661,00 ,48 0,79
Média 1259,00 1,00 1,74 1172,00 1,00 1,75 1103,00 1,00 1,79 1387,00 1,00 1,64
Source: PNAD. Monetary values ​​deflated to the year 2012, excluding workers with incomes equal to zero.
Occupational structure; Brazil, 1995-2011
1995 2005 2001 2011
 
The composition of the occupational groups is also noticeably different if we analyse 
the distribution of workers by sex. There is a steady growth of women in the 
“managers” group, as the former nearly double over the period, with 40% of this 
group’s total workers. A similar trend is followed by “service and salesworkers”, a 
group in which women’s share rose to 60% of total workers at the end of the period. 
Only in the “professionals” and “craft and related trade workers” groups is there a 
decrease in women’s share. Yet, it is worth stressing the high, and likely to grow, share 
of women in elementary occupations. In 2011, 51.4% of these occupations were filled 
by women as contrasted with their 42.3% total occupied workers’ share. 
 
Graph30 – Proportion of women within occupational groups. Brazil. 1995-
2011
 
Source:1995, 2001, 2005 and 2011 PNADs. 
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The falling men/women inequality trends can be calculated as the ratio between the 
average incomes of each sex group within the broad occupational groups.The results 
presented in the graphbelow show a declining trend relative to the gap between the 
average income of men and women between 1995 and 2011 for the whole of the 
workforce, a decline that is spread across almost every occupational group, yet is 
stronger among “professionals”, “technicians” and “plant and machine operators and 
assemblers”. For those occupational groups, the average gap between men’s and 
women’s wages hits the lowest value for the whole period in 2011. It is worth 
emphasizing that the women’s share in these groups was either high or increased over 
the period (Graph31). 
 
Graph31 – Income ratio of men and women within occupational groups (columns) and 
overall average (lines). Brazil, 1995-2011 
 
Source:1995, 2001, 2005 and 2011 PNADs. 
 
From the point of view of the racial composition of the occupational groups, there is a 
widespread trend of increased participation of self-declared non-whites in the labour 
market between 1995 and 2011, reflected in the increased proportion of non-whites in 
nearly every occupational group and in all greater or lesser prestige and skilled groups, 
though non-whites predominate in the skilled groups.Although it is not the majority 
group as a proportion of total population and total working age labour force, non-whites 
hold more than 50% of the occupational positions in the five lesser prestigeoccupational 
groups in 2011 –62% of the “elementary workers”, following an upward trend over the 
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period –and just about 1/3 of the jobs in the two greater prestige occupational groups, 
“managers” and “professionals” (Graph32). 
 
Graph32 – Proportion of blacks within the occupational groups (columns) and proportion 
of employed blacks (lines); Brazil, 1995 – 2011 
 
Source:1995, 2001, 2005 and 2011 PNADs. 
 
Compounding the inequality of opportunity between whites and non-whites concerning 
the occupational groups’ greater or lesser prestige,there is a component of inequality 
that is internal to the occupational groups themselves.Whatever the occupational group 
taken into consideration, a non-white’s pay is lower than a white’s, and this inequality 
in wage returns across racial groups is significant over the entire period analysed. Still, 
the results in the graph below show a downward trend as concerns theincome gap 
between racial groups for the population as a whole and for most occupational groups. 
These data also corroborate the pre-labour market deficit conditions among blacks and 
mulattoes. 
In general terms, intra-occupation income gap is wider in the higher income, more 
prestigious, and skilled occupations, and much narrower towards the other extremity, 
both in terms of colour and sex. The average gap is higher for whites and non-whites – 
67% for the former – than between men and women, 37% higher for occupied male 
workers. In the elementary occupations, however, the income gap by sex is higher, 






Graph33 – Ratio of income between blacks and whites within occupational groups 
(columns) and overall average (lines). Brazil. 1995-2011 
 
Source:1995, 2001, 2005 and 2011 PNADs. 
 
The most prominent gains in terms of composition suggest a more significant increase 
in higher-skilled and intermediate occupations, in contrast with a substantial decrease in 
elementary, poor skill and agricultural occupations. Additionally, there are downward 
trends regarding sex and race inequality both in terms of the composition of the 
occupational groups and in terms of income levels, even though significant differences 
still persist, especially when we observe high differentials in the more skilled 
occupations and a more than proportional presence of women and non-whites in 
elementary occupations. 
 
8.3. Class Structure 
 
In this last section we present some evidence about the changes that have taken place in 
the country’s class structure. To perform this task, we will make use of one the most 
consolidated class analysis schemes on social stratification in the international 
literature: the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero scheme (EGP). 
The EGP classification operates on the basis of two principles for differentiating forms 
of employment: specificity of knowledge required to undertake the task and monitoring 
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difficulty. To these we must also add ownership of the means of production. The result 
is a class schema that, first, separates owners from non-owners and, then, classifies non-
owners in accordance with the type of employment relation they have with the 
employer,still based on the specificity and monitoring principles (Breen, 2005).  
Employees are classified according to the type of employment relation:the restricted 
working contract, typically associated with the working classes, with a low level of 
occupational autonomy and marked by higher likelihood of worker replacement by the 
employer; and the so-called service relation, typically associated with white-collar 
occupations, characterized by a relation of trust between employer and employee arising 
from a less evident possibility of monitoringthe work considering the specificities (and 
thus higher levels of specialization) in performing the occupation, from which stems 
greater worker autonomy to perform tasks (Ribeiro, Scalon, 2001).  
In this project we use an 11-class version of the EGP scheme (closer, therefore, to the 
original scheme proposed inErikson, Goldthorpe andPortocarero, 1979). Yet, other 
papers used schemes with 7 and 16 classes for analysing the Brazilian social structure 
(Scalon; 1999; Ribeiro & Scalon, 2001; Ribeiro, 2007). Classes used in this analysis can 
be briefly described as follows. 
 
I. Higher grade professionals – Highly-qualified non-manual workers, professionals, 
managers, large proprietors. High specificity, high monitoring difficulty; 
II. Lower grade professionals – Less skilled, non-manual workers, administrators, 
managers in small establishments. Specificity lower than I, high monitoring 
difficulty; 
IIIa. Routine non-manuals, higher degree. Low specificity, high monitoring 
difficulty; 
IIIb. Routine non-manuals, lower degree. Low specificity, low monitoring difficulty; 
IVa2. Proprietors and Employers; 
IVc1. Rural Employers; 
IVc2. Self-employed farmers and subsistence agriculture workers; 
V. Technicians and Supervisors of manual workers; 
VI. Skilled workers; 
VIIa. Semi- and unskilled workers; 
VIIb. Agricultural workers; 
Graph34below reports results that describe the composition of the Brazilian class 
structure according to the EGP typology, applied to all individualsoccupied during the 
reference week.18 In it, we present the proportion (%) of each of the social strata for the 
total universe of occupied workers in each of the years selected. 
18The construction of the EGP typology for analysing social class structure in the 1995, 2001, 2005 and 
2011 PNAD household surveys depends on translating the occupational classification scheme as 
proposed by the IBGE’s CBO household classification to ISCO-88, and from the latter to the EGP 
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I II IIIa IIIb IVa2 IVc1 IVc2 V VI VIIa VIIb
1995 2001 2005 2011
 
Source:1995, 2001, 2005 and 2011 PNADs. 
 
Previous works (Pastore, 1979; Scalon, 1999; Pastore & Valle Silva, 2000; Ribeiro, 
2007) have shown how the Brazilian class structure, as well as that of other late 
modernising countries, was deeply transformed during the urbanisation and economic 
modernisation process that started in the 1960s, levelled off in the 1990s, when the 
country’s urbanization rate exceeds 80%, and stabilized. The occupational structure 
becomes increasingly less concentrated in agricultural occupations, and urban labour 
less concentrated in industrial occupations, with an expansion of the services sector, 
which led to a growth in the urban low-skilled, non-industrial manual strata (VIIa) and 
the low-skilled, non-manual strata (IIIa and IIIb). This process was also driven by an 
increase of informality in the economy, and theprecarious labour and productive re-
organisation relations that took place mostly in the 1990s.  
In view of the country’s continuing urbanisation, at a moment of serious economic 
slowdown, the set of low-skilled rural occupations, which accounted for the majority of 
the workers, gave rise to a mass of low-skilled urban workers, outlining the contours of 
a new class structure in a “modernised” Brazil, in which occupations linked to the 
economy’s informal sector gained momentum. In this sense, the Brazilian class 
structure acquired new features(Hasenbalg, 2000).  
typology. On this point, we wish to thank researcher Rogério Jeronimo Barbosa, of the Centre for 




                                                                                                                                                                          
What can we say about this new class structure? In the mid-1990s this structure’s 
profile suggested a concentration of workers in low-skilled manual occupations –about 
4 out of every 10 workers were in urban jobs characterized by low (VI) or no (VIIa) 
specialization. In these strata there were mostly manual workersin the manufacturing 
industry (VI) and in the retail and services sector, where informal labour thrived (VIIa). 
Thus, 1.5 to 2 out of 10 workerswere self-employed and/or poorly qualified agricultural 
workers (IVc2 andVIIb), which clearly reflects the dwindling importance of rural work 
in the Brazilian occupational structure resulting from the country’s economic 
modernisation process from the 1960sthrough the 1980s. The low-skilled, non-manual 
urban classes (IIIa and IIIb) also comprised a significant portion– 2 out of 10 –of the 
Brazilian workers, these being the most frequent non-manual urban worker categories in 
the country’s class structure. 
Yet, the profile of the mid-1990s to the early 2010s is not static. There is significant 
growth in the proportion of individuals in classes comprising higher-skilled 
occupations. The proportion of individuals in classes I and II rises from 9.4% in 1995 to 
15.1% in 2011. The low-skilled non-manual urban strata (IIIa and IIIb) also grow over 
the period, the same occurring with the skilled manual urban strata (VI), allocated 
mostly in the manufacturing industry. This trend suggests absorption of more skilled 
industrial labour in comparison with the mid-1990s, with a concurrent reduction in the 
proportion of workers in low-skilled manual urban strata (VIIa), while also suggesting 
an overall rise in the level of skill of the workforce occupied in the country, originating 
a class structure more and more concentrated in occupations based on higher 
qualification and levels of specialisation. This picture is different from that of the 1990s.  
In contrast, the rural strata in general reduce their representativeness in the Brazilian 
class structure over the period analysed, not only employers (IVc1, the smallest class in 
the Brazilian social structure, with less than 1% of total occupied individuals), but also 
smallrural proprietors (IVc2), and manual rural workers (VIIb). Among the 
characteristically urban strata, over the period there is a significant reduction in the 
relative size of the low-skilled, manual urban stratum (VIIa), which falls from 19.3% in 
1995 to 13.4% of total workers in 2011. These findings are consistent with the period’s 
economic activity recovery momentum (with unemployment falling and the informal 
labour market in retreat) and suggest the deepening of the Brazilian class structure 
process of concentration in strata typically associated with higher-grade urban 
occupations, as opposed to the typically agricultural and low-skilled, manual urban 
strata.  






Table24 – Mean Wages, relative % to mean occupied population wages and coefficient of 
wage variation – EGP 11-class scheme – Brazil – 1995, 2001, 2005, 2011.  
1995 2001 2005 2011
Classes EGP Average CV  Relative $ Average CV Relative$ Average CV Relative$ Average CV Relative $
I. Higher professionals 4433,03 0,99 3,56 3996,22 1,05 3,41 3435,85 1,04 3,13 4026,17 0,99 2,92
II. Lower professionals 2229,35 1,16 1,79 1993,64 1,14 1,70 1549,37 1,28 1,41 1844,20 1,15 1,34
IIIa. Routine non-manuals, higher degree 1290,70 1,03 1,04 1214,21 0,91 1,04 1129,58 0,93 1,03 1379,07 1,39 1,00
IIIb. Routine non-manuals, lower degree 1035,64 1,34 0,83 963,32 1,36 0,82 721,02 0,86 0,66 904,81 0,80 0,66
IVa2. Proprietors and employers 4627,87 1,21 3,72 3879,34 1,36 3,31 3477,57 1,55 3,17 4197,52 1,60 3,05
IVc1 - Rural employers 3154,53 1,65 2,54 2798,54 1,88 2,39 3352,10 2,36 3,05 3730,65 1,76 2,71
IVc2. Self-employed farmers and 
subsistence agriculture workers 602,16 2,04 0,48 518,58 1,77 0,44 512,48 1,57 0,47 711,17 2,20 0,52
V.  Technicians and Supervisors of manual 
workers 1612,66 0,95 1,30 1481,13 0,95 1,26 1269,50 0,95 1,16 1660,11 0,86 1,20
VI. Skilled workers 942,73 0,98 0,76 859,39 0,89 0,73 823,28 0,87 0,75 1066,49 0,80 0,77
VIIa Semi- and unskilled workers 548,32 1,40 0,44 534,97 1,14 0,46 465,77 0,76 0,42 634,80 0,77 0,46
VIIb Agricultural workers 411,63 0,81 0,33 404,45 0,70 0,35 449,44 0,67 0,41 654,31 0,75 0,47
Source:1995, 2001, 2005 and 2011 PNADs. 
 
The results show an overall decline in average income levels between 1995 and 2005 
and a recovery to levels higher than the previous from 2005 to 2011. This trend applies 
to practically all strata, yet not all of them reach at the end of the period the same levels 
observed in the preceding period. Considering the strata whose representativeness in 
relation to the whole of the population rose between 1995 and 2011 (Graph25),their 
growth is followed by an increase in the average income level of the working classes, 
especially among skilled manual workers (VI) and technicians and supervisors of 
manual work (V). To a lesser extent, this also occurred with routine, non-manual skilled 
workers (IIIa). The growth in representativeness for the whole of the class structure is 
not followed by an increase in average income levels for the top-skilled strata (I and II) 
and for unskilled non-manual, routineworkers (IIIb). In these two cases, despite the 
recovery spanning from 2005 to 2011, the last item in the series suggests an average 
income that is lower than that of 1995. Considerable gains in average income levels 
occur especially among those strata whose representativeness has been falling, which is 
the case of self-employed rural workers (IVc2), rural employers (VIIb), and of the 
unskilled manual urban workers (VIIa). 
Income inequality across strata, as measured by the stratum’s average income 
percentage in relation to total average, suggests a picture of persisting inequalities, in 
which there are no relevant gains relative to the occupied population’s average for most 
of the strata, yet there are no significant losses either. Among the 11 strata analysed, 
there are three important exceptions to this pattern: the relative income of the highly-
skilled, non-manual strata (I and II) and of the low-skilled, routine, non-manual stratum 
(IIIb) clearly declined over the period, thus indicating a reduction in the income gap of 
strata I and IIin relation to workers’ total average income (both above average) and an 
increased gap in stratum IIIb (below average). This is an additional element in 
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accounting for the income convergence over the period and the narrowing of the income 
gap.  
If one considers that the two last ones are strata that had been expanding within the 
Brazilian class structure over the period, the data suggest that such expansion was 
achieved at the expense of a reduction in the average income gap of these occupations 
in relation to the average and to strata of a lower socioeconomic level. The only case of 
significant income gap reduction in relation to the average income of total occupied 
workers over the period is that of agricultural workers – a clearly declining stratum. All 
others fit the pattern suggested above, in which gains and losses in overall average 
incomes did not necessarily translate into significant reduction in inequality levels in 
relation to the occupied workers’ average.  
Besides income inequality, the Brazilian class structure is also intersected by other 
forms of inequality. The tablebelow presents the composition of EGP strata by sex, 
clearly showing differences in men and women ratios across strata. 
 
Table25 – Proportion of Men and Women by Class (EGP 11-class scheme) – Brazil – 1995, 
2001, 2005, 2011.  
EGP Class 1995 2001 2005 2011 1995 2001 2005
I. Higher professionals 61,60% 56,60% 56,50% 55,90% 38,40% 43,40% 43,50%
II. Lower professionals 56,40% 53,00% 49,00% 45,90% 43,60% 47,00% 51,00%
IIIa. Routine non-manuals, higher degree 36,20% 36,30% 38,00% 38,00% 63,80% 63,70% 62,00%
IIIb. Routine non-manuals, lower degree 54,70% 50,90% 51,50% 46,80% 45,30% 49,10% 48,50%
IVa2. Proprietors and employers 76,70% 73,20% 70,10% 68,80% 23,30% 26,80% 29,90%
IVc1 - Rural employers 95,10% 93,80% 92,40% 89,30% 4,90% 6,20% 7,60%
IVc2. Self-employed farmers and subsistence agriculture workers 53,20% 56,40% 55,00% 59,40% 46,80% 43,60% 45,00%
V.  Technicians and Supervisors of manual workers 92,00% 87,60% 88,90% 84,70% 8,00% 12,40% 11,10%
VI. Skilled workers 75,60% 76,40% 74,40% 76,90% 24,40% 23,60% 25,60%
VIIa Semi- and unskilled workers 36,40% 37,20% 31,10% 28,60% 63,60% 62,80% 68,90%
VIIb Agricultural workers 90,30% 89,10% 89,40% 88,40% 9,70% 10,90% 10,60%
Total 58,70% 58,40% 57,10% 56,90% 41,30% 41,60% 42,90%
Men Women
   Source:1995, 2001, 2005 and 2011 PNADs. 
 
The trend of increased women engagement in the labour market gained traction 
especially between the years of 1990 and 2000, with a significant growth in the 
likelihood of women joining the workforce. This is a milestone in the labour 
commoditization process in Brazil (Guimarães, Barone, Alves de Brito, 2014) and has 
meant a significantly unequal participation in relation to men. Among the urban strata, 
women are a minority in the stratum with the best skilled professionals (I) and among 
proprietors (IVa), besides being significantly underrepresented in every rural stratum 
(IVc1, IVc2 and VIIb). Even among manual urban working classes, women’s position is 
less favourable:they are less concentrated in the technical and supervision strata (V) and 
skilled strata (VI), are expanding and generally linked to the manufacturing industry and 
the economy’s formal sector; and are the majority among unskilled manual workers 
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(VIIa), in decline over the period and generally associated with typical informal market 
occupations.  
Overall, women’s participation grows over the period analysed, from 41.3% to 43.1% 
of total occupied workers. This growth, however, is more or less significant depending 
on the stratum analysed. There is increased women participation in the two highest 
strata (I and II), in the unskilled, non-manual stratum (IIIb) and among unskilled, 
manual urban workers (VIIa, where they constitute a majority since 1995). This growth 
in women’s participation is even observable among strata formerly dominated almost 
exclusively by men. This occurs especially in the technical and supervision occupations 
(V) and in the proprietor classes, both urban (IVa2) and rural (IVc1).  
The results suggest, too, the persistence of barriers to women’s participation in the 
skilled manual workers’ stratum (VI), which grows sharply over the period yet retains 
unequal chances of participation by sex. On the other hand, women’s predominance in 
the skilled, routine, non-manual workers’ stratum (IIIa) remains stable.  
But not just the composition by sex establishes differences across social strata for the 
Brazilian case. Racial inequality is also a feature of the Brazilian social structure. The 
table below shows the racial composition – in whites and non-whites – of the social 
strata as classified by the EGP scheme. 
 
Table26 – Proportion of Whites and Non-Whites by Class (EGP 11-class scheme) – Brazil 
– 1995, 2001, 2005, 2011. 
EGP Class 1995 2001 2005 2011 1995 2001 2005
I. Higher professionals 78,50% 80,80% 77,20% 73,70% 21,50% 19,30% 22,90%
II. Lower professionals 66,10% 68,70% 61,90% 58,40% 33,90% 31,20% 38,10%
IIIa. Routine non-manuals, higher degree 63,60% 66,70% 61,60% 57,60% 36,30% 33,20% 38,50%
IIIb. Routine non-manuals, lower degree 57,00% 60,80% 53,20% 49,60% 42,90% 39,20% 46,80%
IVa2. Proprietors and employers 75,30% 78,10% 73,40% 71,20% 24,70% 21,90% 26,50%
IVc1 - Rural employers 72,20% 67,70% 64,40% 65,10% 27,80% 32,20% 35,60%
IVc2. Self-employed farmers and subsistence agriculture workers 46,50% 44,90% 40,10% 37,70% 53,50% 55,10% 59,80%
V.  Technicians and Supervisors of manual workers 57,80% 57,50% 56,60% 55,20% 42,30% 42,60% 43,40%
VI. Skilled workers 51,00% 53,00% 50,00% 44,80% 48,90% 46,90% 50,00%
Whites Non-Whites
 Source: 1995, 2001, 2005 and 2011 PNADs. 
The results show how the Brazilian class structure tends to present a higher 
concentration of whites in the higher-degree strata (I, II and IIIa) and in the strata that 
characterize the proprietor and employer classes (IVa2 and IVc1). Non-white 
individuals tend, conversely, to be concentrated in strata characterized by manual, 
unskilled occupations, both in urban and rural areas, as can be seen in the racial 
composition of strata IVc2 (self-employed rural workers), VIIa (unskilled manual 
workers) and VIIb (agricultural workers).  
Class inequality between whites and non-whites in the country shows a significant 
predominance of whites in the highest socioeconomic strata (a) in urban, non-manual 
jobs, (b) in urban, manual workand (c) in agricultural work. Among the non-manual 
urban strata, non-whites are the majority only in the low-skilled, routine, non-manual 
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strata (IIIb); in the urban manual strata, whites make the majority of the technicians and 
supervisors (V), while non-whites prevail in less autonomous, manual skilled 
occupations (VI) and in manual, unskilled occupations (VIIa); in the countryside, whites 
are the majority only among the employers (IVc1), while non-whites comprise the 
majority of the self-employed rural workers (IVc2) and employed agricultural workers 
(VIIb). 
But just as with the composition by sex, this class structure profile is not static. There is 
a general upward trend in non-white participation in all strata. This change in the overall 
average levels of participation by race is the result of increased non-white participation 
in the highest strata, as well as of increased non-white participation in the manual and 
lesser skilled strata.  
The reduced barriers to non-white participation in the non-manual urban strata are made 
more evident in theless qualified professionals and managers stratum (II) and among 
low-skilled, non-manual, routine workers (IIIb). In the countryside there are two other 
strata in which these barriers declined significantly: among agricultural employers 
(IVc1) andself-employed agricultural workers (IVc2). The non-whites’ chances of 
belonging to the skilled, non-manual, routine work stratum (IIIa) and to the skilled, 
manual worker stratum (VI) also increase, yet not so sharply.  
Therefore, in spite of some significant changes in race-class inequality, there still 
persists an important dimension for the reproduction of the original class inequality by 
racial groups that tends to allocate whites in the more prestigious positions in the recent 
Brazilian class structure. 
In short, the evolution of the period encompassed by this analysis suggests a class 
structure that is responsive to the recovery trendof the economy and the levels of 
employment and formal labour,with rising representativeness of the higher-skilled, non-
manual strata (I and II) and the lesser skilled manual strata (V and VI), typically linked 
to the formal sectors of the labour market, as opposed to the declining importance of 
unskilled manual work, both in urban and rural areas (VIIb and VIIa).  
This change in the class structure was followed by a decrease in average wage 
differentials in the highly-skilled, non-manual urban (I and II) and proprietorstrata 
(IVa2), as well as in the low-skilled, non-manual urban strata (IIIb), whose income gap 
declines in relation to the total occupied workers’ average wage over the period. This 
trend is highly specific to these strata.  
However, in the case of the manual urban and rural strata (both skilled and unskilled), 
there are no gains in terms of income when this is compared with the occupied workers’ 
average wage. In this connection, it is worth pointing out the persistence of inequalities 
in wage returns by class for most of the strata, especially among manual workers.Still, 
within each stratum inequality fell. 
This is also a class structure that tends to incorporate men and women unequally. From 
its inception, the analysis shows an unequal structuring prompting a concentration of 
women in non-manual, routine occupations (IIIa) and placing them among the poorly-
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skilled manual workers (VIIa), often linked to the economy’s formal sector. Certain 
strata are almost entirely made up of men, as with rural employers (IVc1), technicians 
and supervisors of manual occupations (V),and rural workers (VIIb), all with more than 
90% of male participation in 1995. Over the period analysed, women’s participation 
grows in part of the strata, especially in the less qualified professionals and managers 
stratum (II), in which they become the majority in 2011, among the low-skilled, non-
manual routine workers (IIIb), urban employers and proprietors (IVc1), technicians and 
supervisors of manual work (V) and unskilled manual workers (VIIa).  
It is worth stressing that these gender inequalities evolved more sharply to the detriment 
of women in the manual working classes, following a class participation pattern 
according to which women tended to be concentrated in low-skilled, manual urban 
occupations (VIIa), at a moment when the economic recovery promotes a growth in the 
technical and specialized urban and manual strata, which were overwhelmingly 
appropriated by menand in which barriers against women incorporation remain 
significantly high.  
From the point of view of racial inequality, there is an overall upward trend in the 
proportion of non-whites among occupied workers, which is reflected in increased non-
white participation in the various strata. From a point of departure in which there is 
evidence of unequal incorporation of whites and blacks, with white overrepresentation 
in the highest strata, both among non-manual and manual workers, the recent evolution 
evidenced a more significant increase of the non-white population among lesser skilled 
professionals and managers (II), low-skilled, non-manual, routine workers (IIIb), 
employers (IVc1) and self-employed agricultural workers (IVc2).  
At the end of the period, this is a class structure that tends toward decreased race and 
gender inequalities in general, but still poses very clearly defined barriers in certain 
strata less porous to the incorporation of women and non-whites, reproducing 
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Appendix – Estimates for wage inequality in Brazil 
 


































Graph A5 - Distribution of wages by population share. Brazil. 1983-2011 
 




Graph A6 – Average of real wages by work status. Brazil. 1983-2011 (constant 2012 R$) 
 




Graph A7 - Histograms of log nominal wages across work status (standardized, and 
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Graph A8 – Decomposition of Theil index of wages by work status. Brazil. 1983-2011. 
 
 












Graph A10 - Histograms of log nominal wages across sex, work status and area 
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Graph A11 – Decomposition of Theil index of wages by sex. Brazil. 1983-2011. 
 
 




















Graph A14 – Decomposition of Theil index of wages by race. Brazil. 1983-2011. 
 
 





Table A1 – Decomposition of Theil index of wages by race, across sex, work status and 
area (Percentage of between-groups inequality). Brazil. 1983-2011 (in %). 
 Area Work status  Sex  1995 2005 2011 
Rural 
Registered 
Total 4.9 0.7 1.5 
Male 4.8 1.0 1.6 
Female 7.5 0.5 5.6 
Non-
registered 
Total 5.2 3.3 0.9 
Male 5.0 3.1 1.4 
Female 11.6 4.8 0.1 
Urban 
Registered 
Total 6.1 5.6 5.2 
Male 7.2 6.4 6.4 
Female 5.4 5.6 4.8 
Non-
registered 
Total 7.3 6.1 4.3 
Male 8.0 6.8 4.9 
Female 6.9 5.4 4.3 












Graph A16 – Decomposition of Theil index of wages by education. Brazil. 1983-2011. 
 
 






Table A2 – Decomposition of Theil index of wages by education, across sex, work status 
and area (Percentage of between-groups inequality). Brazil. 1983-2011 (in %). 





Total 28.1 15.0 5.9 
Male 36.2 15.8 8.8 




Total 10.2 10.3 6.0 
Male 10.7 9.3 7.8 





Total 37.2 34.8 30.5 
Male 45.1 39.8 36.0 




Total 31.4 30.1 26.8 
Male 37.7 32.9 32.4 
Female 32.7 35.4 28.9 
* Results are not statistically significant for rural area. 








* Rural North was included in PNAD from 2004 onwards. 




Graph A18 – Decomposition of Theil index of wages by education. Brazil. 1983-2011. 
 
 





Table A3 – Decomposition of Theil index of wages by region, across sex, work status and 
area (Percentage of between-groups inequality). Brazil. 1983-2011 (in %). 





Total 1.1 7.9 6.9 
Male 0.3 9.1 8.0 




Total 10.9 14.7 9.4 
Male 8.8 15.1 10.1 





Total 2.7 2.6 2.6 
Male 2.7 3.0 3.2 




Total 5.8 5.3 5.4 
Male 5.9 6.3 6.6 
Female 5.9 3.8 3.7 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
 
 
Graph A19 – Fields decomposition of wages, all observations, stepwise for 2011-12 
 





Graph A20 – Fields decomposition of wages, urban, stepwise for 2011-12 
 





Graph A21 – Fields decomposition of wages, rural, stepwise for 2011-12 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on PNAD/IBGE microdata. 
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